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Jetter, Michael, Ph.D.  The University of Memphis.  June 2011.  Three Essays in 
Economics.  Major Professor: William T. Smith, Ph.D. 
 
My dissertation consists of three essays analyzing the results of decisions made by 
workers, both on the microeconomic as well as the macroeconomic level.  My first essay, 
which is a co-production with Wayne Grove and Andrew Hussey, investigates the 
determinants of the gender wage gap.  Specifically, the paper points out that noncognitive 
skills, preferences for life and career, but also preferences for work ethics and work 
environment, are able to account for as much as one third of the explained portion of the 
gender wage gap. 
My second essay, which is co-authored with Dr. Pinaki Bose, provides a possible 
explanation why some tax amnesties are successful in terms of revenue collection and 
participation rates (for example Ireland, Colombia, India twice, and France), whereas 
others are not.  In particular, I am modeling the taxpayer‘s decision whether to accept an 
amesty offer from the tax authority and derive conditions under which she will be inclined 
to do so.  The results show that if economic conditions change substantially, for example 
by a trade liberalization of the domestic country, a perfectly rational agent will find it 
optimal to accept a tax amnesty. 
In my third essay, I am developing a theoretical model identifying the relationship between 
the volatility of private sector wages and growth.  The model suggests two distinct 
channels in which wage volatility affects growtg: a positive direct way (working through 
precautionary savings) and a negative indirect way (working through the mediating role of 




analysis provides strong evidence for the existence of both effects.  Thus, this paper 
establishes wage volatility as a growth determinant and explains why previous growth 
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  The following three essays are, at first glance, to be placed into three different categories 
within Economics: the first article focuses on discimination in the labor market, the second 
provides a theoretical examination of tax amnesties, and the third essay analyzes the effects 
of uncertainty in wages on the growth rate of an economy.  Also, the methods used in 
these three articles vary.  However, the one main theme that ties them all together is the 
economic phenomenon of workers making decisions under certain circumstances.  My 
dissertation analyzes the path and the outcome of people‘s decisions in a variety of ways: 
(1) in an empirical way to analyze the reasons for the gender wage gap, (2) in a theroetical 
framework to assess the impact of a tax amnesty, and (3) in both a theoretical and an 
empirical way to analyze how uncertainty in one‘s wage ultimately affects a country‘s 
growth rate of Gross Domestic Product.  
  The first essay uses a unique dataset to shed light on why women continue to earn less 
than men.  In addition to previously found contributing factors, I am able to identify a 
variety of new variables, which allow us to ulitmately explain up to 82 percent of the 
gender wage gap.  By using empirical methods that are specifically designed for 
discrimination analyses (such as the Oaxaca-Blinder or the Gelbach decomposition), the 
paper shows that noncognitive skills, but especially preferences for life, career, and 
whether a job contributes to society, are able to explain a major remaining part of the 
gender wage gap.   
   In the second essay I analyze the fact why tax amnesties have been very successful in 




tax evader‘s decision whether to accept an amnesty or not, the model shows that an 
amnesty will be attractive to a worker if new possibilities arise within the legal sector.  In 
reality, one could think of new trade arrangements with other countries, newly available 
technologies, or other forms of development that make businesses more profitable.  In 
fact, countries that experienced success in their tax amnesties confirm our theory, as they 
all have been going through strong economic periods during the time of amnesty 
declaration.  
   In the third and final essay I examine worker‘s decisions from a more macroeconomical 
point of view, focusing on the growth rate of a country‘s Gross Domestic Product.  
Previous analyses have neglected a possible impact of uncertainty in wages on the growth 
rate.  My model shows that there are two distinct channels in which wage volatility (wage 
uncertainty) affects growth: in a positive direct way through precautionary savings and in a 
negative indirect way through the composition of the labor market.  Finally, I analyze the 
theoretical implications on a panel data set with over 600 observations of mostly developed 
economies, using a 3-Stage-Least-Squares approach.  All results confirm the theoretical 
predictions, showing that wage volatility is indeed a significant predictor of growth.  This 
being a result in itself, this essay also provides a possible explanation as to why previous 
papers did not find a consensus on how various sorts of volatilities affect growth: the 
significant indirect effect has been neglected before.  
   In summary, my main interests in Economics circle around people‘s decisions.  Why, 
how, and what kind of decisions they make, is what ties my dissertation and my future 






THE GENDER PAY GAP BEYOND HUMAN CAPITAL: 






While the gender earnings gap has narrowed sharply since World War II, women 
continue to earn 20 percent less than men.
1
  Aware of gender pay disparity, Americans, 
according to a 2004 survey, attribute it (i) largely and equally to women‘s priority for 
family over careers and to employers‘ discrimination against women in hiring and 
promotion practices, then to (ii) differences in noncognitive skills, namely assertive 
negotiating, and finally, and least importantly, to (iii) the possession of education and skills 
needed for high paying jobs (Hill and Silva, 2005, p. 3).  After decades of publications 
investigating male-female earnings differences, economists have formed a consensus that 
human capital variables—like education, work experience and skills—explain more and 
discrimination explains less of the gender income gap than the public thinks.
2
  Despite the 
                                                 
*
 For helpful comments, we thank Catherine Eckel, Madonna Harrington Meyer, Paul 
Oyer, Sol Polachek, Anne Winkler, participants of our session at the 2009 Southern Economic 
Association meeting, and participants of the University of Memphis seminar. All errors are our 
own. 
 
1. For gender wage gap literature surveys, see Altonji and Blank (1999) and Polachek 
(2006). 
 
2. Although the unexplained component of the gender wage gap is often attributed to 
discrimination, it may also result from a misspecification of the relationships or from unobserved 
gender heterogeneity (Polachek and Kim 1994; Altonji and Blank 1999).  Regarding 
discriminatory behavior, see, for example, Neumark et al. (1996) and Goldin and Rouse (2000).  




public‘s common sense understanding that career success is influenced by noncognitive 
skills, such as confidence, motivation, and assertiveness, and by work/life preferences, 
economists cannot offer a consensus judgment regarding the wage gap effect of either.  
The human capital model of Becker (1964) predicted earnings differences to arise from 
differences in the broad array of individual abilities and in educational investments.  Due 
to the ease of using cognitive test scores and the difficulty of empirically operationalizing 
personality traits and noncognitive characteristics, to date empirical analyses have used 
cognitive test scores to proxy for ―individual ability‖.
3
  Social scientists, able to typically 
account for only half of the gender pay gap with human capital models based on nationally 
representative datasets, have long hypothesized that gender heterogeneity may characterize 
noncognitive skills
4
 and a variety of work/life preferences, both of which cause wage 
differences.
5
  Now a burgeoning literature, especially by those conducting lab and field 
experiments, reports gender heterogeneity of preferences and noncognitive skills (Croson 
and Gneezy 2009; Booth 2009).  Economists and others, though, are just beginning to test 
the labor market outcomes of such gendered work-life choices and personality traits.
6
 
                                                                                                                                                 
waves of our dataset, found that obtaining an MBA sharply diminishes the gender wage gap, 
comparing wages of MBAs and non-MBAs.  
 
3. Regarding the challenges of systematically analyzing the labor market outcomes of 
noncognitive skills, see Borghans et al. (2008) and ter Weel (2008). 
 
4. Psychologists prefer the term character or personality traits (see Thiel and Thomsen 
2009).   
 
5. For example, Blau and Kahn (1997), using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
for full-time workers with incomes and labor market experience, found an unadjusted male-female 
wage ratio of 72.4 percent in 1988.  Controlling for human capital variables, occupation, industry 
and unionism explains half of the gap.  Polachek and Kim (1994), also using the PSID, estimate 
that half of the male-female earnings differences results from unobserved gender heterogeneity. 
 
6. See, for example, Bowles et al.‘s (2001) review of the early explanations of wage 




Using an especially rich national dataset, the twin goals of this paper are (1) to 
identify noncognitive and preference sources of otherwise unobserved gender 
heterogeneity and then (2) to estimate whether such heterogeneity accounts for more of the 
male-female earnings gaps than can be explained by an extensive set of human capital 
variables.
 
 We view our analysis, then, as part of a broad agenda to enrich the human 
capital model as envisioned by Becker (1964) by more fully understanding the variation of 
individual abilities, especially of noncognitive skills and of work/life preferences, and how 
such heterogeneity influences labor market outcomes. 
Economists have taken three approaches to better understand the gender pay gap.  
First, the growing lab and field experiment findings about gender differences in, for 
example, confidence, career-orientation, and assertiveness, are consistent with gender 
earnings gaps, with the under-representation of women in the upper tier of leadership in 
professions and corporations, and with the anecdotal evidence of professional women 
―opting out‖ of careers
7
; to date, though, little empirical analysis has investigated those 
potential relationships (Thiel and Thomsen 2009).  The notable exceptions focus on the 
personality traits of the Big Five (see Braakmann 2009; Mueller and Plug 2006) and 
measures of locus of control and self-esteem (Fortin 2008; Urzua 2008).  We test the role 
of various confidence measures and 15 noncognitive skills (deemed especially important 
                                                                                                                                                 
―The Noncognitive Determinants of Labor Market Outcomes and Behavioral Outcomes.‖  In 
response to criticisms of narrowly measuring ability, as of July 2009 the GRE includes a formal 
measure that attempts to capture noncognitive skills (the "Personal Potential Index"). 
 
7. A recent survey by Catalyst, for example, found that ―26 percent of women at the cusp of 
the most senior level of management don‘t want the promotion‖ (Belkin 2003).  For anecdotal 
evidence of high powered professional women ―opting out‖ of careers, see Belkin‘s (2003) widely 
read article in The New York Times Magazine.  In contrast, Stone (2007) argues that mostly 
professional women want to but cannot manage to raise children and function in demanding careers 
(see also Leonhardt 2010).  However, Antecol (2010) find that professional women largely return 




for business professionals) in explaining the MBA male-female pay gap. 
Secondly, scholars have focused upon gender differences in labor market tastes 
such as the priority of family, career, wealth, and job characteristics.  According to Long 
(1995) and Fortin (2008), the priority of work and money contributes to the pay gap.  
Chevalier (2007) finds that women with a preference for childbearing earn less even before 
they have children due to their choice of college major and because they engage less 
intensively in job searching (also see Goldin and Polachek 1987).  Our data contain a 
variety of individuals‘ priorities regarding family and career, as well as reported 
importance of non-pecuniary job attributes, recorded about eight years prior to the earnings 
data we assess. 
Finally, because nation-wide datasets, like the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), lack information regarding, for example, college quality, college major and 
detailed work histories, researchers have sought smaller specialized and homogeneous data 
sets with greater educational and labor market detail; examples from individual institutions 
of higher education include studies based on surveys of undergraduates from Harvard 
College (Goldin and Katz 2008), lawyers from the University of Michigan (Wood, 
Corcoran, and Courant 1993), and MBAs from the University of Chicago (Bertrand et al. 
2009) and the London School of Business (Graddy and Pistaferri 2000).  Children, 
according to Bertrand et al. (2009), mainly contribute to female MBAs‘ reduced earnings 
via fewer hours worked and increased career interruptions.
8
  Furthermore, from the 
Harvard and Beyond dataset, female MBAs have greater difficulty balancing careers and 
                                                 
8. A recent New York Times article entitled ―A Labor Market Punishing to Mothers‖ 
(Leonhardt 2010), which cites Bertrand et al. (2009), makes a similar argument about professional 





children than do medical doctors, lawyers, or Ph.D.s (Goldin and Katz 2008; Herr and 
Wolfram 2009).  In addition to children, though, Bertrand et al. (2009) also attribute the 
gender wage gap to differences in MBA training and hours worked.  Because these data 
sets come from individual elite institutions, it is not clear how their results generalize either 
to typical MBAs or to other average highly educated professionals. 
The existence of a unique and especially rich dataset, the GMAT Registrant 
Survey, allows us to estimate the role of preferences and noncognitive skills in explaining 
the gender earnings gap.  A stratified random sample of all registrants for the Graduate 
Management Admission Test (GMAT), the GMAT Registrant Survey, contains 
longitudinal data in four waves from 1990 to 1998.  After registering to take the GMAT 
but prior to enrolling in an MBA program (Wave I), respondents provided information 
regarding career and family priorities, 15 noncognitive skills, expected future managerial 
responsibility, individuals‘ job preferences regarding the importance of non-monetary job 
characteristics, and information used to create five confidence measures.  The data set also 
provides detailed information about both undergraduate and MBA educational 
experiences, work histories, earnings, family background, marriage, children, and more.  
Drawn from a national sample of aspiring MBAs, this data set includes the wide range of 
MBA program qualities and types available in the United States (Arcidiacono et al. 2007), 
rather than merely graduates of the most elite programs (for example Bertrand et al. 2009; 
Graddy and Pistaferri 2000).
9
 
Among our sample of MBAs, females employed full-time earn 15.5 percent less 
per year than do males, a smaller gap than is found in economy-wide datasets (for instance 
                                                 
9. Since a majority of the overall increase in wage inequality from 1973 to 2003 resulted 
from wage differences across levels of educational attainment (Lemieux 2006), our sample allows 




Blau and Kahn 1997).  When we add basic human capital variables (for example family 
background, work experience, ability measures, undergraduate and MBA educational 
experiences), the unexplained gap falls to 9.5 percent, and then further to 6.5 percent with 
the addition of hours worked and current employment characteristics.  Finally, the 
addition of work/life preferences and noncognitive variables to the human capital model 
yields a marginally significant earnings gap of 4.3 percent. 
The results from Oaxaca-Blinder and Gelbach decompositions (Gelbach, 2009) 
clarify how differently men‘s and women‘s experiences, expectations, preferences, and 
noncognitive skills influence career outcomes and how much these novel variables help 
account for the gap.  The final decomposition analysis, based on all of our variables, 
accounts for up to 82 percent of the raw gender pay gap (versus 49-69 percent with just the 
human capital variables).  Of the explained gap, about a quarter is accounted for by gender 
heterogeneity in labor market tastes and noncognitive skills – remarkably, about the same 
proportion explained by both hours worked and current job characteristics; human capital 
variables explain the remaining half.  To put our results in context, Fortin (2008), the 
study most similar to ours, explains up to 25 percent of the raw gender pay gap, of which 
her set of noncognitive skills accounts for 5-6 percent.
10
 
―Good citizen‖ characteristics and behaviors of female MBAs, namely their high 
ethical standards and choice of jobs that contribute to society, account for some of the 
earnings gap.  Thus, the MBA women in our sample apparently desire to work differently 
than do male MBAs, and consequently earn less. 
 
                                                 
10.  Fortin (2008), investigating the role of self-esteem, locus of control, priority on 
money and work, and the importance of family, finds the priority on money and work to most 





The data used in our analysis comes from the GMAT Registrant Survey, a 
longitudinal survey of individuals who registered for the Graduate Management 
Admission Test (GMAT), an admission requirement for the vast majority of MBA 
programs in the United States.  The survey, sponsored by the Graduate Management 
Admission Council (GMAC), was mailed to the same individuals in four waves, between 
1990 and 1998, whether or not they actually took the GMAT.
11
  The Wave I survey 
occurred from April 1990 to May 1991, shortly after test registration, but prior to MBA 
enrollment.  Of the 7,006 registrants initially surveyed, 5,885 responded to the first 
survey, 4,327 to the third survey, and 3,771 to the fourth in 1998.
12
 
The GMAT Registrant Survey includes information about the following seven 
categories: (1) demographics and family status, (2) previous higher education (college 
major, area of study,
13
 GPA, school quality, and whether they possessed a 
post-baccalaureate degree other than an MBA), (3) an employment history including prior 
earnings, industry, and work experience, (4) a set of self-assessed noncognitive skills 
deemed important for success in business, (5) preferences regarding work/life priorities 
and non-pecuniary job characteristics, and career expectations, (6) MBA concentration, 
                                                 
11. These data were collected by the Battelle Memorial Institute (Seattle, Washington 
State) for the Graduate Management Admission Council (GMAC).  The same dataset has been 
used by Montgomery (2002), Montgomery and Powell (2003), Arcidiacono, et al. (2007) and 
Grove and Hussey (forthcoming). 
 
12. Though attrition more heavily affected those who never entered into an MBA program 
than those who did, those who left the sample look similar to those who remain in a number of 
different observable characteristics, including gender, race, test scores, and labor market outcomes. 
An appendix characterizing the attrition in more detail is available on request. 
 
13. Rather than individual majors, we only know which of the following five broad areas 




program quality, pace (full- or part-time), and type (whether an executive program), and 
(7) current employment, earnings, and information about non-monetary assessments of 
their job. 
Of the 3,771 respondents to the fourth and final survey, we limit our analysis to 
those who: (1) obtained an MBA in the sample period (approximately 43 percent of 
respondents); (2) worked full-time (35 hours per week or more) at the time of the fourth 
survey and reported the associated earnings information (82 percent of the remaining 
individuals); (3) took the GMAT and had non-missing values for the multitude of control 
variables included in the analysis (70 percent of remaining individuals).  Our final sample 
includes 933 individuals, of whom 586 are males and 347 females. 
For descriptive statistics of our sample, see Table 1 in which we report separate 
means and standard deviations by gender and p-values for tests of the equality of means 
between males and females.  The dependent variable is the logarithm of total annual 
earnings on the job, for currently employed individuals at the time of the fourth survey 
(note we also conduct our analyses for hourly wage and hours worked; see the Robustness  
section).  The average male in our sample earned $67,116, which is $9,483 more per year 
(in 1997 dollars) than the average female, for a raw wage gap of about 15.5 percent.  To 
account for some variation in the timing of survey responses, we used the Consumer Price 
Index to adjust all earnings to January 1997 dollars. 
Human Capital Control Variables 
In order to explain the gender gap in earnings, we begin by considering 
demographic variables, namely age, race, and both the mother's and father's years of 




black women than black men.  Family circumstances differ substantially, with men much 
more likely to be married and twice as likely to be married with children. 
Total work experience and current job tenure were constructed from responses to 
questions in the initial survey regarding the total number of years the respondent worked 
full-time for pay since the age of 21 and then with subsequent surveys‘ questions about 
starting and stopping dates (to the nearest month) of jobs.  Women have fewer years of 
total work experience and job tenure at the time of the Wave I survey.  Brown and 
Corcoran (1997) attribute as much as a third of the gender wage gap in their sample to work 
experience (also see Joy 2003 and Daymont and Andrisani 1984). 
To account for differences in undergraduate educational background, we include 
cumulative grade point average (out of 4.00), college major, and measures of the 
selectivity of the college attended (from Barron's Profiles of American Colleges).  







Descriptive Statistics of Sample, by Gender 
 
 (1) Male (2) Female 
 p-value for 
male=female 







(1) - (2) 
Annual Salary ($) 67116 27813 57633 23467 9483 0.00 
Demographic/Background 
           Age 34.84 6.00 34.07 5.82 0.77 0.06 
     Asian 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.32 0.01 0.61 
     Black 0.07 0.25 0.18 0.38 -0.11 0.00 
     Hispanic 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.38 -0.02 0.36 
     Mother's education 
           (years) 14.49 3.55 14.03 3.80 0.45 0.07 
     Father's education 13.63 3.15 13.62 3.25 0.02 0.94 
Employment Experience 
           Work experience (years) 10.75 6.70 9.98 6.03 0.78 0.08 
     Tenure (years at current 
           job) 4.35 4.61 3.61 3.41 0.74 0.01 
Family Variables 
           Married 0.72 0.45 0.59 0.49 0.13 0.00 
     Kids (1 = yes) 0.48 0.50 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.00 
     Married*Kids 0.47 0.50 0.22 0.41 0.25 0.00 
Undergraduate Variables 
           Highly selective 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.01 0.70 
     Moderately selective 0.31 0.46 0.25 0.44 0.06 0.06 
     Business major 0.46 0.50 0.56 0.50 -0.10 0.00 
     Social science major  0.18 0.38 0.16 0.36 0.02 0.39 
     Humanities major  0.06 0.25 0.11 0.31 -0.04 0.02 
     Engineering major  0.19 0.40 0.07 0.26 0.12 0.00 
     Science major  0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.96 
     Cumulative GPA 3.02 0.41 3.15 0.40 -0.13 0.00 
Ability Measures 
           Quantitative GMAT 32.39 8.00 28.31 7.51 4.08 0.00 
     Verbal GMAT 30.70 7.12 29.88 7.35 0.82 0.09 
MBA Variables 
           Cumulative GPA 3.33 0.88 3.28 0.91 0.05 0.40 
     Top 10 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.37 
     Top 11 – 25 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.88 
     Part-time program  0.50 0.50 0.52 0.50 -0.02 0.60 
     Executive program 0.07 0.26 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.07 
     Finance concentration  0.23 0.42 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.00 
     Marketing                   0.10 0.30 0.14 0.35 -0.05 0.04 
     Accounting 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24 -0.01 0.37 
     Concentration 
           MIS concentration 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.56 





Table 1 continued, Descriptive Statistics of Sample, by Gender 
       Variable 
 (1) Male (2) Female 
 p-value for 







(1) - (2) 
     International 
      
     Concentration 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.11 
     Other concentration 0.19 0.39 0.28 0.45 -0.10 0.00 
Noncognitive Skills 
      
     Initiative 3.54 0.54 3.61 0.53 -0.07 0.05 
     High ethical standards 3.66 0.54 3.76 0.45 -0.10 0.00 
     Communication skills 3.36 0.59 3.45 0.58 -0.10 0.02 
     Work with diversity 3.57 0.59 3.66 0.55 -0.09 0.03 
     Shrewdness 2.77 0.74 2.59 0.74 0.18 0.00 
     Ability to organize 3.49 0.59 3.59 0.56 -0.10 0.01 
     Physical attractiveness 3.03 0.59 3.11 0.60 -0.08 0.05 
     Assertiveness 3.16 0.64 3.20 0.60 -0.05 0.27 
     Ability to capitalize on 
      
     change 3.18 0.64 3.13 0.62 0.05 0.23 
     Ability to delegate tasks 3.25 0.67 3.22 0.69 0.03 0.51 
     Adapt theory to 
      
     practical situations 3.19 0.68 3.08 0.68 0.11 0.02 
     Understanding business 
      
     in other cultures 2.54 0.83 2.58 0.87 -0.04 0.46 
     Good intuition 3.27 0.64 3.33 0.66 -0.06 0.19 
     Ability to motivate                
others 
3.25 0.67 3.33 0.60 -0.08 0.07 
     Being a team player 3.60 0.56 3.64 0.55 -0.04 0.28 
Confidence: Ability 
      
     Quantitative expectations 3.85 0.81 3.43 0.78 0.42 0.00 
     Verbal expectations 3.48 0.73 3.55 0.67 -0.07 0.17 
Work/Life Preferences 
      
     Family important 0.89 0.31 0.90 0.31 0.00 0.86 
     Career important 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.04 0.22 
     Wealth important 0.20 0.40 0.14 0.35 0.06 0.03 
     Relatives/friends 
      
     important 0.49 0.50 0.66 0.48 -0.17 0.00 
Confidence: Admissions 25.22 6.57 25.57 6.79 -0.35 0.44 
Confidence: Connections 
      
     Knowing the right people: 
      
     admissions 3.79 2.41 3.74 2.48 0.05 0.76 
     Knowing the right people: 
      
     managerial success 2.55 0.77 2.53 0.71 0.02 0.69 
Managerial Goals 
      
     High managerial 
      
     responsibility 0.70 0.46 0.69 0.46 0.00 0.88 






Table 1 continued, Descriptive Statistics of Sample, by Gender 
       Variable 
 (1) Male (2) Female   
p-value for 






(1) - (2) 
     Medium managerial  
      
     responsibility 0.23 0.42 0.27 0.44 -0.04 0.20 
Job Preferences 
           Non-monetary job 
           attributes 33.75 3.45 34.62 3.37 -0.87 0.00 
     Contributes to society 0.11 0.31 0.19 0.39 -0.08 0.00 
Current Job: Hours and 
Characteristics 
           Hours per week 50.26 8.54 48.94 8.82 1.32 0.02 
     Self-employed  0.05 0.21 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.02 
     Large firm  0.36 0.48 0.39 0.49 -0.03 0.34 
     Medium sized firm 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.03 0.41 
     Small firm 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.88 
     Non-profit 0.04 0.20 0.10 0.29 -0.05 0.00 
     Government 0.12 0.32 0.14 0.35 -0.03 0.24 
     Agricultural, forestries &  
           fisheries 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.12 
     Manufacturing 0.28 0.45 0.21 0.41 0.07 0.02 
     Service industries 0.29 0.45 0.35 0.48 -0.07 0.04 
     Finance, insurance & 
           real estate 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.36 0.02 0.48 
     Public administration 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.32 -0.02 0.28 
     Percent female in 
           occupation 0.41 0.13 0.44 0.15 -0.04 0.00 
Observations 586 347     
 
Notes:  Sample includes respondents to both the first and fourth waves of the GMAT 
Registrant Survey who obtained an MBA, were employed in a full-time job (>=35 
hours/week) at the time of the fourth survey, and had non-missing values for all variables 
(except for MBA GPA, for which a missing value dummy variable was included in all 
regressions).  Most variables were obtained from Wave I of the survey, except for current 
employment variables, job tenure, work/life preferences variables, the ‗contributes to 
society‘ variable (which were obtained from Wave IV), and work experience (which was 







  Using Barron's selectivity categories,
15
 men attended somewhat 
more ―moderately selective‖ undergraduate institutions but no statistically significant 
differences existed in graduating from ―highly selective‖ schools.  Although our data 
includes information regarding students‘ general areas of study, rather than specific 
majors, according to Weinberger (1998) narrowly or more broadly measuring college 
major causes no notable differences in estimated gender wage gaps.  We include dummy 
variables for whether or not the individual received a degree in the social sciences, 
humanities, sciences, or engineering, with business as the omitted category.  Twice as 
many males majored in engineering as undergraduates, whereas females were more likely 
to have majored in business and the humanities. 
An advantage of our data is that the survey information was merged with GMAT 
registration and testing records; thus, we have actual quantitative and verbal GMAT 
scores, not self-reported standardized test scores, as is typical of higher education studies.
16
  
Males received much higher scores on the quantitative GMAT than did females (14 percent 
higher) and slightly higher verbal scores (3 percent higher). 
Regarding the MBA experience, we include cumulative grade point average (out of 
4.00) and indicators of program quality and program schedule, namely whether part-time, 
                                                 
14. This reflects fewer science and math courses taken by women (Montmarquette et al. 
2002). 
 
15. We collapsed the various undergraduate admission selectivity categories as designated 
in Barron‘s into the following three categories: Highly Selective (19 percent of our sample), 
Moderately Selective (26 percent), and the omitted category representing the least selective schools 
and those not included in the Barron‘s guide (55 percent). 
 
16. While we refer to GMAT scores as ability measures, according to the Graduate 
Management Admission Council the GMAT "is a standardized test designed to measure verbal, 
mathematical, and analytical writing skills that have been developed over a long period of time 




full-time, or an Executive program.  Unlike with undergraduate grades, MBA‘s grade 
point averages did not statistically differ by sex (Table 1).  For program quality, we 
include variables indicating whether the program attended was ranked in either the Top 10 
or Top 11-25, according to U.S. News and World Report 1992 rankings.  No gender divide 
existed for MBA attainment from top programs.  Note that only about five percent of our 
sample attended Top 10 and about eight percent Top 11-25 programs; thus, our sample is 
of the average MBA graduates in the U.S., whereas other prominent MBA gender gap 
studies have been of graduates of elite programs, such as the University of Chicago 
(Bertrand et al. 2009) and the London School of Business (Graddy and Pistaferri 2000). 
Consistent with greater work experience, men were more likely to attend Executive 
MBA programs than women (Table 1).  Grove and Hussey (forthcoming) found, as in the 
context of undergraduate studies, that particular areas of emphasis in graduate business 
studies affect post-MBA earnings as much as can overall program quality.  Thus, we 
include variables indicating whether or not the individual focused their studies in particular 
areas of concentration (finance, marketing, accounting, management information systems 
(MIS), international business, or others
17
).  Females were more likely to concentrate in 
marketing, while males were about twice as likely to concentrate in finance (which Grove 
and Hussey [forthcoming] find results in higher earnings). 
In several specifications we control for differences in current employment 
characteristics.  Since our dependent variable is annual earnings, we include hours worked 
per week (although recall that our sample is already limited to those working 35 hours or 
                                                 
17. The "other" category includes the following reported concentration areas: human 
resources, health care administration, entrepreneurial management, industrial management, 
production/operations management, public administration, real estate, statistics or operations 
research, transportation, and economics. Due to small numbers of individuals reporting 




more per week).  Females in our sample report working about one hour less per week than 
men, a statistically significant difference (see Table 1).  Since an earnings premium for 
employees of larger firms has consistently been found in the literature (see Oi and Idson 
1999 for a review), we include variables indicating employment at a large firm (defined as 
having 25,000 or more employees worldwide), a medium firm (between 100 and 25,000 
employees), or a small firm (less than 100 employees).  No gender differences exist in 
employment by firm size (Table 1). 
Using 2-digit industry codes, we include indicator variables for five broad industry 
areas, as well as indicator variables for self-employment and whether employed by the 
government or a non-profit organization.  Men were significantly more likely to be 
self-employed and to work in manufacturing, whereas women were more likely to work at 
a non-profit organization or in the service industry (see Table 1).  Three-digit 
occupational codes and a Bureau of Labor Statistics variable representing the estimated 
percentage of females within the occupation reveal that women, in this sample, worked in 
occupations with a high percentage of females (Table 1).  Although Boraas and Rodgers 
(2003) find that occupational segregation constitutes the largest component of the gender 
wage gap, MacPherson and Hirsch (1995) attribute it to less than 7 percent of the 
male-female wage gap. 
 
Gender Heterogeneity of Non-Traditional Variables 
Beyond the human capital and employment variables, the GMAT Registrant 
Survey allows us to construct and include several variables related to individuals' 




have only recently begun to pinpoint these factors as potentially relevant in helping to 
explain the gender earnings gap,  individual differences due to personality have long been 
a core research agenda among personality psychologists (see, for example, Roberts, 
Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi and Goldberg 2007). 
The first survey wave asked individuals to rate the extent to which they have fifteen 
different noncognitive skills (what psychologist prefer to label as character or personality 
traits; see Thiel and Thomsen 2009), deemed relevant for success as a manager or business 
professional.  We include variables for responses ranging from one ("not at all" having the 
characteristic or skill) to four ("very much" having the characteristic or skill) for each of 
the following: initiative; high ethical standards; communication abilities; ability to work 
with people from diverse backgrounds; shrewdness; ability to organize; physical 
attractiveness; assertiveness; ability to capitalize on change; ability to delegate tasks; 
ability to adapt theory to practical situations; understanding business in other cultures; 
good intuition; ability to motivate others; and being a team player.  Montgomery and 
Powell (2003) combined all of these responses into a single variable, which they refer to as 
a "confidence index."  In order to relate our results to the scholarship focused on gender 
heterogeneity in noncognitive skills, we enter each trait separately to isolate its individual 
effect.  Of the 15 self-reported traits, eight exhibit statistically significant (at the 5 percent 
level) gender differences.  Specifically, females rated themselves as possessing greater 
initiative, higher ethical standards, better communication abilities, better organizational 
abilities, and a stronger ability to work with people from diverse backgrounds.  Males, on 
the other hand, reported greater shrewdness and ability to adapt theory to practical 




attractiveness and ability to motivate others. 
We create five confidence measures which may help to explain earnings and the 
gender earnings gap, since individuals may either sort into jobs or be rewarded on the job 
due to their perceived, rather than actual, abilities.  First, we include variables intended to 
represent one's confidence in their quantitative and verbal abilities.  Immediately after 
registering to take the GMAT but before taking the exam, respondents were asked, in the 
first survey wave, how well they expected to do on the quantitative and verbal sections of 
the GMAT.  Responses ranged from one ("excellent") to five ("poor") which we reversed 
so that a higher number means greater confidence.  Since actual GMAT scores are 
controlled for in all of the specifications where we include these expectations, we interpret 
these expectations of verbal and quantitative performance as indicating confidence in one‘s 
own abilities.  Men reported significantly more confidence in their quantitative abilities 
but not more in their verbal abilities than did women.  Actual GMAT scores reveal that, on 
average, men received much higher quantitative and marginally higher verbal GMAT 
scores (Table 1). 
In addition, we include an admission confidence measure.  The initial survey, on a 
scale from one ("very") to four ("not at all"), asked how difficult particular steps in the 
admission process would be, such as obtaining letters of recommendation, preparing for 
the GMAT, or making the right impression on the application form.
18
  We reverse the 
order of these responses and, using equal weight for each response, combine them into a 
single index, which we call "admission confidence.‖  No differences exist in men‘s and 
                                                 
18. The following is a complete listing of the included admission steps: Prior work 
experience; Undergraduate grades; Letters of recommendation; Preparing for the GMAT; Doing 
well on the GMAT; Knowing the right people; Visiting graduate schools; Making the right 




women‘s confidence of succeeding in admission-related tasks (Table 1). 
Finally, because personal connections may importantly affect job success, we 
include two related measures of confidence in one‘s connections.  First, we extract one 
component of the admission confidence index – ―knowing the right people‖ – and include 
it on its own.  Second, we include a variable from the noncognitive skill self-assessment 
section of the initial survey of "knowing the right people," ranging from one ("not at all") to 
four ("very much").  Here, women and men report similar levels of confidence in both 
types of connections (Table 1). 
Different family and career priorities may sort women and men into higher or lower 
paying jobs.  The fourth survey asked individuals to evaluate, on a scale from one to four, 
the importance of various aspects of their lives.  In particular, we include separate 
variables indicating whether or not the surveyees reported as "very important" (the highest 
category) each of the following: family and children, career and work, friends and 
acquaintances, and wealth.  The importance of family and career do not statistically differ 
but more males considered wealth and females considered friends and acquaintances as 
very important aspects of life (Table 1). 
We also include variables reflecting future job expectations, intended to pick up 
potential differences between males and females in their managerial aspirations.  In the 
initial survey wave (approximately seven to eight years prior to the earnings observations 
included in our analysis), individuals were asked about their expected employment 
situation five years in the future.  We include variables indicating whether the individual 
reported expecting to be a non-manager (the omitted category), an entry-level manager, or 




―high managerial responsibility‖ and a quarter of both expected ―medium managerial 
responsibility.‖ 
The initial survey also asks individuals to indicate the importance of several work 
environment characteristics for the position they expect to have five years later.  We 
combine these responses (each on a scale from one to four) into an index intended to 
capture individual preferences over non-monetary job characteristics.
19
  Females reported 
significantly higher importance of the non-monetary job attributes of their expected future 
job.  Finally, we allow for possible gender differences in preferences over the social 
stewardship of their work.  In deciding to take their current job, 19 percent of females 
reported (in Wave IV surveys) their job contributing to society was ―very important‖, 










                                                 
19. The following characteristics are included in this index, giving equal weight to 
responses for each: the work is interesting; the people I work with are friendly; the chances for 
promotion are good; the job security is good; my responsibilities are clearly defined; I am free from 
the conflicting demands that others make of me; the hours are good; promotions are handled fairly; 
my employer is concerned with everyone getting ahead; I have enough time to get the job done.   
 
20. This variable ranges from one ("Not at all important/Not applicable") to four ("Very 
important").  For variables where answers range from one to four (or five respectively), we tried 
using dummies in various combinations (for example grouping responses of one – not at all having 




2.III Empirical Methodology 




                   
      




where Si is reported annual log earnings and εi is an individual error term.  Our primary 
parameter of interest is γf, the coefficient on the Female indicator variable.  X
b
i contains a 
vector of the basic human capital control variables, as described in the previous section.  
This analysis assumes that the social processes under examination operate the same way 
for men and women.  We initially run regressions containing only these covariates, and do 
so by adding each variable or subset of variables sequentially.  We then include X
e
i, which 
contains our expanded set of controls, also described in the previous section.  Once again, 
particular variables or classes of variables are added in sequential regressions in order to 
investigate the effect of their inclusion on the estimate of γf. 
While some information regarding the contribution of each set of variables can be 
gleaned from sequential addition of these variables to the model, the observed effect of 
each set of variables is influenced by the order in which they are added, a point which is 
emphasized by Gelbach (2009).  To address this concern, we also carry out two types of 




gender earnings gap.  In the first method, in the style of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), 








where Xig contains, alternatively, either our basic set of human capital variables, our 
expanded set of variables, or both.  The male and female models can be subtracted from 
each other to decompose the mean gender salary gap into the mean difference in observed 








where the first term on the right-hand side represents the explained part of the gender salary 
gap – the group differences in observed characteristics, and the second term allows for 




perspective of females, describing their predicted outcome if they had males‘ 
characteristics and returns to those characteristics.  Of course, it could also be written 
from the perspective of males.  Depending on the choice of reference group – and 
therefore the point of view – results will vary.  As an alternative, it may be useful to 
employ a weighting scheme in assigning a reference group, rather than placing full weight 
on one gender versus the other.  The discrimination literature offers several such 
alternatives.
21
  For the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition analyses, we use three such 
weighting schemes.  We report decompositions where all of the weight is placed 
alternatively on either male or female coefficients.
22
  In our preferred specification, 
following the approach advocated by Neumark (1988) and Chevalier (2007), we use the 
coefficients from a pooled regression over both males and females.  In this case, the salary 




                                                         
                  





                                                 
21. Reimers (1983), for example, suggested the use of the average coefficients over both 
groups: β
*
 = 0.5βm + 0.5βf.  Similarly, Cotton (1988) proposed the use of coefficients weighted by 
sample group sizes: β
*
 = nm/(nm + nf)βm + nf/(nm + nf)βf. 
 
22. In addition to robustness, an advantage of reporting both of these decompositions is 
that, unlike the initial pooled regressions including both genders, they provide some insight into the 






is the vector of pooled coefficient estimates.  In each case, we focus on the 
―explained‖ portion of the gap, the first term in equations (3) and (4). 
Apart from the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions, we also employ an approach 
advocated by Gelbach (2009).  Unlike the Oaxaca-Blinder approach, this decomposition 
is grounded in the formula for sample omitted variables bias.  Gelbach's approach 
provides a method to decompose cross-specification differences in pooled OLS estimates 
of the female coefficient (along the lines of our multitude of specifications from Tables 2 
and 5), but does so in a path-independent manner.
 23
  We view this approach as an 
additional robustness check against the results obtained from the traditional 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition using pooled coefficients.  Like in the explained portion 
of the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions, whether gender heterogeneity in a variable (or set 
of variables) increases or decreases the gap depends on whether, conditional on other 
covariates, the variable positively or negatively affects wages, and whether the mean of the 
variable is higher for males or females. 
 
2.IV Empirical Results 
2.IV.A Standard Human Capital Model Variables 
2.IV.A.1. Pooled OLS Estimates 
The estimates from a series of pooled OLS regression models are shown in Table 2. 
Moving from left to right in the table coincides with the inclusion of additional control 
                                                 
23. In particular, Gelbach notes that if Xi contains K variables, the contribution of the k-th 
variable to the gap                                   is given by    
  multiplied by    , where     are the 
estimates of the coefficients on the female variable from K auxiliary regressions of each of the k 
covariates on female.  See Gelbach (2009) for more details.  In addition, the Stata code for the 
Gelbach decomposition can be found on the author‘s website: 





variables, which are generally added in groups by variable classification.  The primary 
coefficient of interest is that on the Female variable, which, due to the log specification of 
the dependent variable, represents the unexplained percentage gap in salary between male 





 Pooled OLS Estimates of Gender Salary Gap: Human Capital Variables 
      Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
   Female -0.155** -0.137** -0.138** -0.129** -0.109** -0.134** -0.114** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
Demographic       
   Age 
 
0.104** 0.045 0.042 0.055* 0.057* 0.058* 
 (0.019) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) 
   Asian 
 
0.060 0.076** 0.079** 0.032 0.025 0.031 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
   Black 
 
0.003 0.011 0.016 0.003 0.038 0.084** 
 (0.042) (0.041 (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) 
   Hispanic 
 
0.039 0.046 0.051 0.040 0.046 0.066* 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 
   Mother's education 0.008* 0.009** 0.009** 0.006 0.005 0.004 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
   Father's education 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.009* 0.009* 0.007 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Employment Experience 
         Experience 
  
0.038** 0.037** 0.032** 0.033** 0.030** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
   Tenure 
  
-0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Family Variables 
         Married 
   
0.007 0.008 -0.000 0.005 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) 
   Kids 
   
-0.087 -0.074 -0.081 -0.068 
 (0.087) (0.086) (0.084) (0.084) 
   Married*Kids 
   
0.114 0.113 0.120 0.111 
 (0.092) (0.090) (0.089 (0.088) 
Undergraduate Variables 
        Highly selective  
   
0.194** 0.201** 0.160** 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
   Selective  
    
0.073** 0.076** 0.060** 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
   Engineering major 
   
0.080** 0.098** 0.068* 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) 
   Grade Point Average 
    
0.172** 0.135** 
  (0.030) (0.031) 
Ability Measures 
         Quantitative GMAT 
     
0.005** 
  (0.002) 
   Verbal GMAT 
      
0.004 
 (0.002) 
R-Square 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.21 
 








Table 2 continued, Pooled OLS Estimates of 
Gender Salary Gap: Human Capital Variables 
       Variable (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Female  -0.092** -0.095** -0.069** -0.065** 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) 
MBA Variables 
         Executive program  0.127** 0.126** 0.124** 0.107** 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.049) (0.049) 
     Top 10  0.396** 0.385** 0.280** 0.295** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.050) (0.049) 
     Top 11 - 25  0.170** 0.189** 0.118** 0.140** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.041) (0.041) 
     Finance concentration  0.121** 0.119** 0.104** 0.071** 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) 
     Cumulative GPA 
 
0.100** 0.041 0.039 
 (0.046) (0.043) (0.042) 
Current Job: Hours and Characteristics 
        Hours per week 
  
0.015** 0.014** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
     Large firm  
   
0.087** 
 (0.036) 
     Medium firm  
   
0.070** 
 (0.034) 
     Non-profit  
   
-0.142** 
 (0.047) 
     Government  
   
-0.190** 
 (0.048) 
     Finance, insurance & real estate 
  
0.094** 
  (0.037) 
     Percent female in occupation 
  
-0.252** 
  (0.083) 
R-Square 0.29 0.30 0.39 0.43 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of annual salary of current, full-time (>= 35 hours/week) 
jobs of MBA graduates reported in Wave IV (933 observations in each regression).  
Models (2)-(11) include age
2




; (5)-(11) control for 
social science, humanities, and science majors; (8)-(11) include the variables of (7), 
dummies for part-time program, and various concentrations: Marketing, Accounting, MIS, 
International, and Other; (11) includes whether the individual is self-employed and 
dummies for the following industries: agriculture, forestries & fisheries, manufacturing, 
service, and public administration.  Statistical significance of the coefficient at the 5 and 




As shown in column 1, in terms of raw differentials, females earn approximately 
15.5 percent less than males in the sample.  Not surprisingly, this gender gap is smaller 
than nationwide estimates since ours is of a more homogeneous group: MBAs.  The 
inclusion of demographic variables slightly decreases the gap to below 14 percent (the 
specification in column 2).  Despite significantly lower average female job tenure (at the 1 
percent level) and marginally lower work experience (at the 10 percent level), the inclusion 
of the employment experience variables, both years of work experience and tenure in the 
current job, does not alter the wage gap, even though total work experience is highly 
related to earnings in all specifications (column 3).  Because of the nonlinearity in returns 
to both experience and tenure, the combined returns to these variables flatten out somewhat 
by their sample means (about 10.5 and 4 years, respectively), resulting in relatively little 
effect on the earnings gap due to the modest differences in experience between men and 
women.  Furthermore, these variables are highly correlated with age, and the coefficient 
on age decreased substantially in this specification. Excluding age from the regressions 
results in the work experience variables decreasing the gender earnings gap by 1.3 
percentage points.  As exemplified here, the fact that the order in which variables are 
added influences their perceived effect provides motivation for the decompositions 
performed in the next section.  Under the decompositions, the work experience variables 
generally explain positive and significant portions of the gap.  Still, the relatively small 
effect of work experience observed here contrasts with the findings of, for example, Brown 
and Corcoran (1997), who report that differences in work experience account for as much 
as about one third of the 24 percent wage gap for women with some college education.
24
 
                                                 
24. This difference is due to the fact that men in our sample only had about 7 percent more 




While more males are married and have children than females in the sample, 
including these control variables, as well as an interaction term of married with children, 
decreases the gender salary gap by 6.5 percent, from 13.8 to 12.9 percent; surprisingly 
though, none of those variables significantly influences salaries.  This outcome is in stark 
contrast to the labor market literature and to Bertrand et al. (2009) and Wood et al. (1993), 
who find a strong mother penalty for University of Chicago MBAs and University of 
Michigan lawyers, respectively.  Although the inclusion of human capital variables in 
subsequent specifications does not change these relationships, married-with-children 
becomes strongly significant with the introduction of hours worked (column 10) and then 
with the addition of employer characteristics (column 11).  The only child penalty we find 
is for unmarried women (but not unmarried men; from results not displayed here).  Note 
that the average age in our sample was 34 for women and 35 for men, by which point 
female University of Chicago MBAs had already experienced a child penalty, according to 
Bertrand et al. (2009). 
The model specifications presented in columns 5 through 9 correspond to the 
addition of several human capital and ability variables.  Columns 5 and 6 show an 
interesting effect of undergraduate variables—the gap decreases by 2 percentage points 
when controlling for college major choice and selectivity of undergraduate institution 
attended.  The results concur with previous findings in the literature that choice of major is 
one reason for raw gender gaps; here, the effect is smaller than in previous studies 
(McDonald and Thornton 2007; Joy 2003; Daymont and Andrisani 1984), perhaps because 
the average individual in the sample is 12 years beyond college graduation.  Although 
having attended a highly selective or moderately selective college strongly influences 
                                                                                                                                                 




earnings, again despite being years after graduation, only those from the highly selective 




Despite the passage of time, undergraduate grades prove to strongly predict 
earnings, to the extent that increasing one's GPA by one letter grade increases their 
earnings by 17.2 percent (column 6).  Taking the respondent‘s undergraduate GPA into 
account sharply increases the unexplained salary gap back up to over 13 percent, since 
females in our sample report higher grades than their male counterparts. 
Adding GMAT scores to the regression (column 7) decreases the gender salary gap 
to 11.4 percent.  These quantitative score results are similar to the relationship reported by 
Paglin and Rufolo (1990) between quantitative GRE scores and wages.  Interestingly, the 
addition of MBA experience variables (column 8) causes quantitative GMAT scores to 
lose significance and verbal GMAT scores to gain significance (not reported in Table 2), 
suggesting that perhaps part of the reason for GMAT scores‘ high returns is through their 
ability to get students into a better quality MBA program or for students to select particular 
areas of concentration.  Though not shown, it is worth noting that while quantitative 
GMAT scores‘ significance continued to decrease with the addition of employment 
characteristics (in columns 10 and 11), verbal GMAT scores‘ significance increased, 
suggesting that quantitative abilities may serve to sort individuals into particular types of 
jobs, while verbal abilities appear to independently affect earnings. 
The addition of MBA variables (column 8) dramatically reduces the wage gap by 2 
percentage points.  The effect of the graduate program variables parallels that of the 
                                                 
25. In the specification reported in column 11 of Table 2, the coefficient for highly 




undergraduate variables: aspects of the program such as overall quality (we included Top 
10 and Top 11-25) and the choice of particular study concentrations decrease the gap to 
about 9 percent.  Both MBA program selectivity measures are strongly significant in all 
specifications.  Only those who concentrated in finance earned more than others (similar 
to the result found by Grove and Hussey, forthcoming). 
As with undergraduate grades, adding MBA GPA (column 9) slightly increases the 
size of the unexplained gap (even though those grades did not significantly differ by sex); 
unlike with undergraduate grades, though, MBA GPA loses significance when work 
characteristics are included.  Respondents‘ work hours strongly influence wages (column 
10), reducing the unexplained gap by more than 25 percent or 2.6 percentage points; 
adding hours worked causes MBA grades to lose significance, but the married with 
children coefficient to gain significance (neither shown in Table 2).  Finally, the inclusion 
of various characteristics of the individual‘s firm in Wave IV, namely company size, types 
and industries (column 11), narrows the gender wage gap slightly to 6.5 percent.  Those 
employed in big and medium sized firms and in the finance industry earn more compared 
to nonprofit or government employees who make significantly less.  Although our results 
confirm the literature regarding the role of firm size on wages (Oi and Idson 1999), unlike 
Graham et al. (2000), firm size explains little of the gender salary gap because in our 
sample women and men with MBAs do not work in different sized firms (see Table 1).  
Lastly, women disproportionately work in occupations with a high percentage of women 
which strongly and negatively affects earnings (akin to MacPherson and Hirsch‘s [1995] 
finding of a small but important role in accounting for gender wage gaps, rather than the 




In sum, these detailed demographic, family, and human capital measures explain 58 
percent of the raw gender wage gap [(15.5 – 6.5)/15.5].  However, because the order in 
which we add control variables affects these results, we now turn to the decomposition 
analysis to examine the simultaneous contribution of each set of our basic variables in 
explaining the male-female earnings gap. 
 
2.IV.A.2  Decomposition Analyses for Standard Human Capital Model Variables 
As described in Section III, to determine the contribution of each category of 
variables in explaining the raw wage differentials, we conduct several decompositions.  
Initially, we perform Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions using coefficients from pooled (male 
and female) regressions; then, we compare these results to similar decompositions using 
coefficients from either male-only or female-only regressions, as well as Gelbach 
decompositions (2009).  Table 3 illustrates the contribution of each individual category in 
explaining the wage gap, based on the coefficients from a pooled model.  Columns 1-11 
display, for each category individually, (1) the amount of explained contribution, (2) the 
standard errors in parenthesis, and (3) the percent of the contribution to the overall raw 
salary gap.  Column 12 contains all categories together except the hours worked and job 
characteristics variables, which explain 59 percent of the gap.  Finally, in column 13, all 





Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions of Gender Log Salary Gap: Explained Contributions of Human Capital Variables  
Included Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Demographic/ 0.02**   
         
0.00 0.00 
Background 15.2% 
          
5.4% 0.7% 
              Employment 0.01 
         
0.02** 0.02** 
Experience 5.7% 
         
12.9% 10.3% 
              Family 
  
0.03** 





        
12.4% 15.3% 
              Undergrad 
  
0.03** 





       
9.9% 8.0% 
              Undergrad 
   
-0.01** 
      
-0.01* -0.01* 
GPA 
    
-9.1% 
      
-5.4% -4.8% 
              Quantitative 
    
0.05** 
     
0.01* 0.01 
GMAT 
    
30.7% 
     
9.2% 4.2% 
              Verbal 
      
0.01 
    
0.00 0.00 
GMAT 
     
6.0% 
    
1.5% 2.2% 
              MBA 
       
0.02* 
   
0.02** 0.01* 
Variables 
      
13.4% 
   
11.7% 8.0% 
              MBA 









              Current Job: 









              Current Job: 




Characteristics          22.2%  12.2% 
Notes:  Reported are explained contribution and percent contribution (percentage of the raw gap explained).  Each class of 
variables corresponds to variables from Table 1.  Each specification includes 933 observations.  ** and * indicates coefficient 




So, for example, quantitative GMAT scores by themselves can explain 30.7 percent 
of the salary gap (column 6) but only a marginally significant 9 percent with all variables 
except work hours (column 12), and then lose significance with the addition of current job 
characteristics (column 13).  Several classes of variables individually explain modest but 
significant portions of the gap; quantitative GMAT scores explain almost a third of it, even 
more than the job variables can on their own.  Altogether in column 13, the most 
important classes of variables determining male-female wage differences are family 
variables (15.3 percent), hours worked and current job characteristics (each 12.2 percent), 
employment experience (10.3 percent), and undergraduate and MBA variables (each 8.0 
percent). 
We now investigate the robustness of these results by carrying out alternative 
decompositions, including a Gelbach decomposition and Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions 
using either male or female coefficients.  Table 4 displays the results, as well as those 
from the previous decomposition for comparison.  Conducting separate analyses by 
gender also allows us to determine whether men‘s and women‘s outcomes are influenced 
differently by their demographic and family backgrounds, educational and work 
experience, and current work environment.
26
  Whereas five categories of variables are 
strongly significant in the pooled coefficient decompositions, only three are when using 
male coefficients and two with female coefficients; only one variable, hours worked per 
week, mattered for both men and women and employment experience was only significant 
in the pooled results.   
 
                                                 





        Multiple Decompositions of Gender Log Salary Gap: Explained Contributions of Human Capital Variables 
   Variable (group) 
Oaxaca-Blinder Oaxaca-Blinder Oaxaca-Blinder Gelbach 
Using pooled coefficients Using male coefficients Using female coefficients Decomposition 
contribution % of gap contribution % of gap contribution % of gap contribution % of gap 
Demographics/Background 0.001 0.7% -0.004 -2.6% 0.007 4.6% -0.001 0.8% 
Employment Experience 0.016** 10.3% 0.012 7.8% 0.010 6.6% 0.015* 9.9% 
Family Variables 0.024** 15.3% 0.025** 15.8% 0.005 3.0% 0.020** 12.7% 
Undergraduate Variables 0.012** 8.0% 0.014** 8.8% 0.003 1.7% 0.012** 7.5% 
Undergraduate GPA  -0.007* -4.8% -0.009 -5.9% -0.011 -7.2% -0.009** -6.0% 
Quantitative GMAT 0.006 4.2% -0.008 -4.9% 0.019 12.3% 0.002 1.3% 
Verbal GMAT 0.003 2.2% 0.006 3.8% 0.000 0.2% 0.004 2.4% 
MBA Variables 0.012* 8.0% 0.012 7.5% 0.007 4.7% 0.010 6.7% 
MBA GPA 0.001 0.5% 0.001 0.6% -0.001 -0.4% 0.001 0.5% 
Current Job Hours 0.019** 12.2% 0.022** 14.0% 0.015** 9.7% 0.019** 12.0% 
Current Job Characteristics 0.019** 12.2% 0.006 3.9% 0.032** 20.7% 0.018** 11.5% 
Total 0.107** 68.9% 0.076** 48.8% 0.086** 55.5% 0.090** 57.8% 
 
Notes: For each variable or set of variables, reported are the net explained contribution of the raw salary gap and the percentage 
of the gap explained due to gender differences in values of each category of variables.  Gelbach decomposition follows Gelbach 
(2009). Each specification includes all of the variables from Table 1, and includes 933 observations.  ** and * indicate explained 




While hours matter for both men and women in explaining earnings, other 
significant effects on the wage gap are gendered: when the male coefficients are used, 
family circumstances and undergraduate experiences account for 16 and 9 percent of the 
gap, respectively; and when the female coefficients are used job characteristics account for 
21 percent of the gap. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that the effect of college quality on earnings is 
larger for males than for females, as the estimated explained contribution of these variables 
is significantly larger when male‘s coefficients are used than when female‘s coefficients 
are used.  Alternatively, the positive return to quantitative GMAT scores appears to be 
driven solely by females and not males.
27
  Finally, the results from the Gelbach 
decomposition are found to be very similar to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition using 
coefficients from the pooled model. The same sets of variables tend to be statistically 
significant predictors of the earnings gap, though the percentage of the gap explained by 
the Gelbach decomposition is generally slightly lower for each set of variables, and the 
overall gap explained is also lower (57.8 percent for the Gelbach decomposition as 
opposed to 68.9 percent for the pooled Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition). 
In summary, then, while the effects of several variables are fairly robust to the 
specification of decomposition used, other variables affect the earnings gap in strikingly 
different ways for men and women drawn from a relatively homogeneous pool: MBA 
recipients.  Overall, the decompositions using slope coefficients estimated from both 
males and females resulted in a higher percentage of the raw gap explained (in particular 
                                                 
27. Recall that males have higher GMAT scores than females (Table 1). A larger 
percentage of the earnings gap is explained by quantitative GMAT scores when female coefficients 
are used in the decomposition as opposed to male coefficients (due to females' estimated high 




the pooled Oaxaca-Blinder approach, explaining 69 percent of the gap), and the 
specification using male coefficients performed the worst (explaining only 49 percent of 
the gap). 
 
2.IV.B  Results for Human Capital Model, Noncognitive Skills, and Labor Market 
Tastes 
2.IV.B.1  Pooled OLS Estimates 
Beyond the standard set of demographic and human capital variables discussed 
above, we now wish to investigate the role of noncognitive factors and preferences on 
incomes, as long speculated by social scientists.  We specifically evaluate gender 
heterogeneity among proxies for some noncognitive skills, various measures of 
confidence, and work and life preferences.   In Table 5, the initial OLS gender wage gap 
estimate of 9.5 percent (column 1) corresponds to the specification of column 9 in Table 3, 
including all human capital variables but not hours and job characteristics.  In columns 
2-8 of Table 5, we sequentially add the following: self-assessed noncognitive skills 
(column 2), confidence in quantitative and verbal abilities (column 3), work and life 
preferences (column 4), confidence of admission to MBA program (column 5), confidence 
to ―have the right connections‖ (column 6), managerial expectations (column 7), and 
non-monetary job preferences (column 8).  All told, adding these variables to our full 








     Pooled OLS Estimates of Gender Salary Gap: Addition of Noncognitive 
Skills and Labor Market Tastes   
      Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.095** -0.093** -0.089** -0.079** -0.078** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Noncognitive Skills 
          Initiative 
 
0.056** 0.055** 0.048** 0.048** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
     High ethical standards 
 
-0.076** -0.076** -0.069** -0.071** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
     Communication skills 
 
0.023 0.023 0.026 0.027 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
     Work with diversity 
 
0.010 0.011 0.013 0.016 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
     Shrewdness 
 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.012 -0.015 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
     Physical attractiveness 
 
0.032 0.031 0.030 0.028 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
     Assertiveness 
 
0.050** 0.050** 0.050** 0.050** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
     Adapt theory to practice 
 
0.029 0.028 0.030 0.034* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
     Being a team player 
 
0.027 0.025 0.027 0.028 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Confidence: Ability 
          Quantitative expectations 
  
0.021 0.017 0.021 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
     Verbal expectations 
  
-0.006 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Work/Life Preferences 
          Family important 
   
0.019 0.019 
 (0.039) (0.039) 
     Career important 
   
0.071** 0.072** 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
     Wealth important 
   
0.070** 0.066** 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
     Relatives/ 
   
-0.011 -0.010 
     friends important (0.023) (0.023) 
Confidence: Admissions 
    
0.004** 
 
    
(0.002) 









Table 5 continued, Pooled OLS Estimates of Gender Salary Gap: Addition of 
Noncognitive Skills and Labor Market Tastes 
       Variable (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Female -0.072** -0.070** -0.059** -0.043* 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) 
Confidence: Connections 
         Knowing the right people: 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.021 
     managerial success (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Managerial Goals 
 
        High managerial responsibility 
 
0.077 0.070 0.052 
  
(0.047) (0.047) (0.044) 
Job Preferences 
 














Current Job: Hours and Characteristics 









































R-Squared 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.47 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of annual salary of current, full-time (>=35 hours/week) 
jobs of MBA graduates reported in Wave IV (933 observations in each regression).  
Models (2)-(9) include ability to organize, to motivate others, to capitalize on change, to 
delegate tasks, understanding business in other cultures, and good intuition; (5)-(9) include 
all variables from Model (4); (6)-(9) control for knowing the right people for admissions; 
(7)-(9) include medium managerial responsibility; (9) controls for self-employed, medium 
firm size, agriculture, forestries & fisheries, manufacturing, service industry, and public 
administration.    Statistical significance of the coefficient at the 5 and 10 percent levels 





The inclusion of all 15 noncognitive skills only slightly decreases the wage gap.  Three of 
those traits are statistically significant: initiative and assertiveness positively influence 
earnings, whereas high ethical standards do so negatively.  While for each of the three 
coefficients the magnitude and significance diminishes as more control variables are 
added, Assertiveness loses significance in the final specification whereas ability to Adapt 
theory to practice gains significance.  Individually, while initiative, assertiveness, and 
high ethical standards significantly affect wages, their effects cancel each other out (the 
two former positively and the latter negatively); thus, we find no evidence of an important 
net role for these particular proxies for noncognitive skills in explaining wage inequality by 
sex (neither in the OLS results from Table 5, nor in either set of the decomposition results 
reported in Tables 6 and 7).
28
 
Next, we consider the influence of five confidence measures on the gender earnings 
gap.  The first indicates respondents‘ expectations about their quantitative and verbal 
scores on the GMAT exam, namely whether they expected to perform in a range from well 
above average to well below average.  Including those expectations marginally narrows 
the gap but the confidence measures themselves are not significant (Table 5, column 3).  
Also, respondents indicated how confident they were that they would be admitted to an 
MBA program.  Although that variable positively and significantly influences wages 
when introduced in column 5, it loses significance thereafter (not shown here).  Finally, 
we probe two confidence indicators associated with having the right connections.  
―Knowing the right people‖ as a criterion for getting into an MBA program is positive but 
not significant.  On the other hand, the extent to which individuals think they ―know the 
                                                 
28. Initiative serves to slightly increase the unexplained salary gap, since women report 
slightly more of that characteristic, whereas women‘s self-reported higher ethical standards 




right people‖ as a criterion for being a successful manager strongly influences wages in all 
specifications.  The addition of these two connection measures decreases the gap by about 
8 percent, from 7.8 percent to 7.2 percent (columns 5 and 6). 
The final set of non-traditional labor market variables that might help explain the 
observed male-female salary gap relate to labor market tastes regarding family, careers, 
and jobs.  Including work and life preferences decreases the wage gap by a full percentage 
point, from 8.9 to 7.9 percent (column 4).  Career importance remains significant in all 
specifications, but the priority of wealth loses significance in the final specification (not 
shown in Table 5).  Job aspirations, in terms of expected managerial status (whether 
respondents reported expecting to be an entry-level manager or a mid-to-upper-level 
manager relative to a non-manager) are not significant, yet slightly lower the gap when 
included (column 7). 
We include two job preference categories: (1) an index of non-monetary job 
attributes (for instance friendly people, job security, chances for promotions, hours are 
good, clear responsibilities) collected from the Wave I surveys and (2) the importance of 
making a positive contribution to society when choosing their current job.  Both are 
strongly significant and negative in all specifications (column 8), suggesting that these 
characteristics serve as compensating differentials.  They also appear to importantly 
account for the gender earnings gap, decreasing the unexplained portion by 1.1 percentage 
points, which corresponds to almost 16 percent of the remaining gap. 
Collectively, additional variables representing preferences, confidence, and 
self-assessed noncognitive skills, when added to the initial set of background and human 




5.9 percent.  In comparison, the addition of these less traditional variables is shown to be 
more effective than was the inclusion of several actual job characteristics, which resulted 
in an unexplained difference of 6.5 percent (Table 2).  In our final model specification 
(column 9) in Table 5, in which we add hours worked and other current job characteristics 
(as in Table 2), the unexplained gender wage gap narrows to a marginally significant 4.3 
percent; that represents merely 28 percent of the raw differential found in our sample, so 
this model explains over 70 percent of the gap. 
Of the novel gender heterogeneity variables, seven individually influence wages in 
the final specification: three noncognitive skills (initiative, assertiveness, and high ethical 
standards), the importance of career, knowing the right people as a key to managerial 
success, and preferences for (i) jobs with non-monetary attributes and (ii) work that 
contributes to society.
 
 The earnings-gap-reducing role of ―knowing the right people‖ for 
MBAs is especially interesting since it has been shown to disadvantage female business 
leaders (Bartlett and Miller 1985). 
 
2.IV.B.2 Decomposition Analyses 
Next we use decomposition analysis to isolate the overall effects of particular 
classes of less traditional variables, namely various proxies for or measures of confidence, 
expectations, and preferences, as we did with the more basic human capital model in 
Tables 3 and 4.  Table 6 depicts the sequential addition of these variables using pooled 
regression coefficients.  We begin including each class of variables separately in the first 
column, labeled (1)-(7) to signal that each of these results corresponds to carrying out 




includes decomposition results for a model containing all of the novel variables without 
our full set of human capital variables.  Then, the next seven columns (9-15) include our 
full set of human capital variables (excluding current employment characteristics), adding 
in separately each class of non-traditional variables. 
Although at least some variables in four of the non-traditional categories were 
significant in earnings regressions (Table 5), only two groups as a whole significantly 
explain differences in men‘s and women‘s salaries when human capital variables are 
included (Table 6, column 16): work/life preferences and job preferences.  Note that, for 
example, ability confidence (not significant in OLS results reported in Table 5) loses 
significance with the inclusion of the human capital variables (in column 16), suggesting 
that self-evaluation of one‘s managerial noncognitive skills is embodied in other human 
capital variables.  Job Preferences (prioritizing non-monetary job attributes and 
employment that contributes to society) are strongly significant in all decomposition 
specifications shown in Table 6, explaining 10 percent of the gender wage gap when all 
variables are included (column 17).  Work/Life Preferences, though, matter only until job 
characteristics are included (column 17).  Thus, work/life preferences, in particular the 









           Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions of Gender Log Salary Gap: Explained Contributions of Full Model  
Included Variables (1)-(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
Noncognitive 0.002 -0.006 0.000 
      
-0.002 0.000 
Skills 1.1% -3.7% 0.2% 
      
-1.2% 0.0% 
            Confidence:  0.036** 0.031** 
 
0.019** 
     
0.006 0.006 
Abilities 23.5% 20.2% 
 
11.9% 
     
4.1% 3.8% 
            Work/Life  0.013** 0.010* 
  
0.010* 
    
0.009* 0.003 
Preferences 8.3% 6.4% 
  
6.6% 
    
6.1% 1.9% 
            Confidence:  0.000 0.000 
   
0.000 
   
0.001 0.000 
Admissions 0.3% 0.3% 
   
0.3% 
   
0.6% 0.2% 
            Confidence:  0.001 0.001 




Connections 0.4% 0.9% 




            Managerial 0.003 0.003 




Goals 1.7% 2.1% 




            Job 0.022** 0.023** 
      
0.015** 0.019** 0.016** 
Preferences 13.9% 14.9% 
      
9.9% 12.4% 10.0% 
            Basic Human  
  
0.089** 0.072** 0.083** 0.083** 0.086** 0.087** 0.074** 0.077** 0.066** 
Capital Variables 
  
57.4% 46.5% 53.5% 53.6% 55.6% 55.8% 47.7% 49.6% 42.5% 
            Current Job:  
          
0.032** 
Characteristics & Hours 
         
20.5% 
            Total Percentage Explained 41.1% 57.7% 58.4% 60.1% 53.8% 57.4% 56.3% 57.6% 74.2% 81.6% 
 
Notes: Reported are the explained contribution (using coefficients from a pooled model) and percent contribution (percentage of 
the raw gap explained).  Each specification includes Basic Human Capital Variables from Table 2 other than Current Job 
variables.  Coefficients in columns labeled (1)-(7) are from separate regressions including only each class of variables 
separately.  Each specification includes 933 observations. ** and * indicate coefficient is statistically significantly different 




Finally, in Table 7, like in Table 4, we display the Oaxaca-Blinder and Gelbach 
decompositions with all variables included.  As just discussed, of the new classes of 
noncognitive variables only job preferences significantly explain the wage gap (in all four 
specifications), although such preferences matter much more when using the female 
coefficients (accounting for 13 percent of the gap) than with the male coefficients (8 
percent).  Beyond that, even more notable than from the human capital model analysis in 
Table 5, is the starkness of the sources of gender differences: only hours worked and job 
preferences are commonly important in the decompositions using either male or female 
coefficients; job characteristics only significantly explain the gap with female coefficients 
and account for 17 percent of it.
29
  Four other categories explain the gap using male 
coefficients—family circumstances (13 percent), undergraduate variables and grades (9 
and -7 percent, respectively), and prior employment experience (9 percent).  Note that 
employment experience and undergraduate GPA only gained significance in Table 7 with 
the presence of the non-traditional classes of variables (see, by contrast, Table 4).   
                                                 
29. That is, hours worked are positively related to earnings and nonmonetary job 
preferences are negatively related to earnings in both female-only and male-only regressions. Since 
males report more hours worked and females report greater preferences towards nonmonetary job 
attributes, both explain a portion of the gap when either male or female coefficients are used in the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions.  Interestingly, actual job characteristics are more important to 
female earnings than they are to male earnings, so male-female differences in these variables result 
in a larger portion of the earnings gap explained when female coefficients are used in the 





        Multiple Decompositions of Gender Log Salary Gap: Explained Contributions of Full Model            
   Variable (group) 
Oaxaca-Blinder Oaxaca-Blinder Oaxaca-Blinder Gelbach 
Using pooled coefficients Using male coefficients Using female coefficients Decomposition 
contribution % of gap contribution % of gap contribution % of gap contribution % of gap 
Demographic/Background 0.001 0.8% -0.008 -5.0% 0.012 7.8% 0.000 -0.1% 
Employment Experience 0.017** 11.1% 0.014* 8.8% 0.011 6.9% 0.017* 10.8% 
Family Variables 0.019** 12.3% 0.020** 12.8% -0.001 -0.7% 0.016** 10.6% 
Undergraduate Variables 0.014** 9.3% 0.014** 9.1% 0.008 5.0% 0.014** 9.0% 
Undergraduate GPA  -0.009** -5.6%  -0.010** -6.6% -0.008 -5.3% -0.010** -6.3% 
Quantitative GMAT 0.008 5.1% -0.004 -2.4% 0.026 16.8% 0.006 3.8% 
Verbal GMAT 0.004 2.4% 0.005 3.1% 0.002 1.4% 0.004 2.5% 
MBA Variables 0.010 6.7% 0.010 6.5% 0.008 5.1% 0.009 6.0% 
MBA GPA 0.001 0.5% 0.001 0.4% 0.000 0.1% 0.001 0.5% 
Current Job Hours 0.016** 10.4% 0.019** 12.1% 0.014** 9.1% 0.016** 10.3% 
Current Job Characteristics 0.015** 10.0% 0.006 3.7% 0.026** 17.0% 0.015** 9.7% 
Noncognitive Skills 0.000 0.0% 0.000 -0.2% -0.007 -4.7% -0.002 -1.4% 
Confidence: Ability 0.006 3.8% 0.005 3.1% -0.002 -1.0% 0.005 3.0% 
Work/Life Preferences 0.003 1.9% 0.006 3.7% -0.006 -3.9% 0.002 1.3% 
Confidence: Admissions 0.000 0.2% 0.001 0.3% 0.001 0.6% 0.000 0.1% 
Confidence: Connections 0.004 2.3% 0.003 2.2% 0.002 1.6% 0.003 2.2% 
Managerial Goals 0.001 0.5% 0.000 0.1% 0.001 0.5% 0.001 0.5% 
Job Preferences 0.016** 10.0% 0.013** 8.2% 0.020** 12.7% 0.015** 9.7% 
Total 0.126 81.6% 0.093 60.0% 0.107 69.0% 0.111 72.2% 
 
Notes: For each variable or set of variables, reported are the net explained contribution of the raw salary gap and the percentage 
of the gap explained due to gender differences in values of each category of variables.  Gelbach decomposition follows Gelbach 
(2009). Each specification includes all of the variables from Table 1 and includes 933 observations.  ** and * indicate explained 




Finally, we should note that adding these non-traditional variables increased the total 
explained percentage of the gender wage gap by 11-13 percentage points.
30
 
In sum, then, the addition of noncognitive skills and labor market tastes accounts 
for about a quarter of our explained gender earnings gap
31
; quite remarkably, this 
approximately equals that accounted for by hours worked and current job characteristics.  
The results in Table 7 also serve to indicate the way that experiences, noncognitive skills, 
and priorities distinctly shape men‘s and women‘s outcomes—even among a group of 
relatively homogeneous individuals, MBAs.  Women‘s socially desirable choices of jobs 
that contribute to society and personality traits, namely high ethical standards, significantly 
reduce their earnings. 
 
2.V Robustness Checks 
In this section we discuss some additional specifications carried out to check the robustness 
of our results.  First, throughout our previous analysis we have used annual salary as the 
dependent variable.  While this specification of earnings has been used in other studies of 
highly educated professionals (see Altonji and Blank 1999), the number of hours an 
individual works may be endogenously determined.  To the degree that females often 
work fewer hours than males, this may be of particular concern in the context of explaining 
the gender earnings gap.  However, the gap in hours worked is relatively small among our 
sample of MBAs.  Nonetheless, to investigate the effect of our choice of dependent 
                                                 
30. The difference between the total explained percentage of the gender wage gap from 
Tables 4 and 7 is 11.2 percentage points with the male coefficients (60.0-48.8), 13.5 with the 
female coefficients (69.0-55.5), 12.7 (81.6-68.9) using pooled coefficients, and 14.4 (72.2-57.8) 
with the Gelbach decompositions. 
 
31. Adding the percentage of the gap explained by the last seven categories in Table 7 




variable, we repeated our analysis from Tables 2, 5, and 7 using hourly wage instead of 
annual earnings. These results are given in Appendix Tables 1 through 3.  It can be seen 
that, throughout our sequential OLS specifications, the coefficients on the female variable 
are a little smaller than the coefficients obtained from the corresponding annual salary 
regressions in Tables 2 and 5.  This is not surprising, since including hours explicitly in 
Table 2 caused the gap to decrease, and using hourly wage effectively controls for hours in 
all specifications.  Thus, the influence of variables in our OLS regressions changes very 
little whether our dependent variable is annual salary or hours worked.  Decomposition 
results also indicate that the choice of hourly wage or annual salary is generally not a 
pivotal one, since the contribution to the explained gap of each set of variables is generally 






                                                 
32. One interesting difference is that the amount of the gender gap explained by the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition using female coefficients increases substantially when hourly wage 
is used as the dependent variable, while the percentage explained when male coefficients are used 
decreases under the hourly wage specification.  Most notably, quantitative GMAT scores account 




Appendix Table 1 
       Pooled OLS Estimates of Gender Wage Gap: Human Capital Variables 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Female -0.128** -0.111** -0.110** -0.093** -0.073** -0.091** -0.077** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Demographic/Background       
   Age 
 
0.086** 0.038 0.031 0.044 0.046 0.045 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
   Asian 
 
0.029 0.044 0.048 0.004 -0.001 0.011 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
   Black 
 
-0.007 0.002 0.008 -0.004 0.021 0.062 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) 
   Hispanic 
 
0.023 0.030 0.037 0.025 0.030 0.048 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
   Mother's education 0.006* 0.007* 0.007* 0.005 0.004 0.004 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
   Father's education 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.002 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Employment Experience 
         Experience 
  
0.032** 0.030** 0.025** 0.026** 0.023** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
   Tenure 
  
-0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Family Variables 
          Married 
   
-0.001 -0.002 -0.007 -0.003 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
   Children 
   
-0.121 -0.109 -0.114 -0.100 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) 
   Married*children 
  
0.183** 0.180** 0.185** 0.173** 
  (0.083) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080) 
Undergraduate Variables 
         Highly selective  
    
0.162** 0.167** 0.131** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
   Selective  
    
0.057** 0.059** 0.044* 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
   Engineering major  
   
0.089** 0.102** 0.081** 
  (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) 
   Grade point average 
    
0.122** 0.087** 
  (0.027) (0.028) 
Ability Measures 
          Quantitative GMAT 
     
0.003 
  (0.002) 
   Verbal GMAT 
      
0.005** 
 (0.002) 
R-Square 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.20 
 








Appendix Table 1 continued, Pooled OLS 
Estimates of Gender Wage Gap: Human 
Capital Variables 
        Variable (8) (9) (10) 
Female -0.060** -0.061** -0.056** 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
MBA Variables 
        Executive program  0.126** 0.126** 0.111** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
     Top 10  0.258** 0.250** 0.261** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
     Top 11 - 25  0.092** 0.098** 0.116** 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) 
     Finance concentration  0.101** 0.100** 0.066** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
     MIS concentration  0.101** 0.101** 0.083* 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) 
     Cumulative GPA 
 
0.023 0.018 
 (0.042) (0.042) 
Current Job: Hours and Characteristics 
















     Finance, insurance & real estate 
 
0.107** 
  (0.037) 
     Percent female in occupation 
 
-0.227** 
  (0.083) 
R-Square 0.25 0.25 0.29 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of hourly wage of current, full-time (>=35 hours/week) 
jobs reported in Wave IV.  Each regression includes 933 observations.  Models (2)-(10) 
include age
2




; (5)-(10) control for social science, 
humanities, and science major; (8)-(10) include the variables from (7), whether the 
program was part-time and the following concentrations: marketing, accounting, 
international, and other; (10) includes whether the individual is self-employed and 
dummies for the following industries: agriculture, forestries & fisheries, manufacturing, 
service, and public administration.  Statistical significance of the coefficient at the 5 and 




Appendix Table 2 
    Pooled OLS Estimates of Gender Wage Gap: Addition of Noncognitive Skills and 
Labor Market Tastes 
       Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female -0.061** -0.057** -0.053** -0.051** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Noncognitive Skills 
         Initiative 
 
0.045** 0.044** 0.044** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
     High ethical standards 
 
-0.067** -0.067** -0.066** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
     Communication skills 
 
0.014 0.014 0.015 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
     Work with diversity 
 
0.006 0.007 0.008 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
     Shrewdness 
 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
     Physical attractiveness 
 
0.023 0.022 0.022 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
     Assertiveness 
 
0.027 0.028 0.027 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
     Adapt theory to practice 
 
0.029 0.027 0.028 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
     Ability to motivate 
 
0.014 0.014 0.013 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
     Being a team player 
 
0.019 0.017 0.016 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Confidence: Ability 
         Quantitative expectations 
  
0.019 0.018 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
     Verbal expectations 
  
-0.002 -0.001 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
Work/Life Preferences 
         Family important 
   
0.032 
 (0.037) 
     Career important 
   
0.006 
 (0.022) 
     Wealth important 
   
0.028 
 (0.029) 
     Relatives/friends important 
   
-0.001 
 (0.022) 
     







Appendix Table 2 continued, Pooled OLS Estimates of Gender Wage Gap 
       Variable (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Female -0.051** -0.044* -0.043* -0.032 -0.033 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Confidence: Admissions -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Confidence: Connections 
          Knowing the right people - 
 
0.029* 0.028* 0.034** 0.034** 
     managerial success (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Managerial Goals 
          High managerial responsibility 
  
0.054 0.049 0.038 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) 
Job Preferences 
          Non-monetary job attributes 
   
-0.008** -0.009** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
     Contributes to society 
   
-0.143** -0.106** 
 (0.031) (0.032) 
Current Job: Hours and Characteristics 
        Large firm 
    
0.068* 
 (0.036) 
     Non-profit 
    
-0.094** 
 (0.047) 
     Government 
    
-0.144** 
 (0.049) 
     Finance, insurance & real estate 
   
0.112** 
  (0.037) 
     Public administration 
    
0.110* 
 (0.057) 
     Percent female in occupation 
   
-0.178** 
  (0.082) 
R-Squared 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.34 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of hourly wage of current, full-time (>=35 hours/week) 
jobs reported in Wave IV (933 observations).  Models (2)-(9) include ability to organize, 
to capitalize on change, to delegate tasks, understanding business in other cultures, and 
good intuition; (5)-(9) include all variables from Model (4); (6)-(9) include whether one 
had confidence in knowing the right people for admissions; (7)-(9) controls for medium 
managerial responsibility; (9) includes whether the individual was self-employed, 
employed at a medium sized firm and the following industries: agriculture, forestries & 
fisheries, manufacturing, service, and public administration.  Statistical significance of 




Appendix Table 3 
        Multiple Decompositions of Gender Log Wage Gap: Explained Contributions of Full Model            
   Variable (group) 
Oaxaca-Blinder Oaxaca-Blinder Oaxaca-Blinder Gelbach 
Using pooled coefficients Using male coefficients Using female coefficients Decomposition 
contribution % of gap contribution % of gap contribution % of gap contribution % of gap 
Demographic/Background 0.001 0.6% -0.007 -5.6% 0.010 8.2% 0.000 -2.3% 
Employment Experience 0.016** 12.7% 0.013 9.9% 0.015 11.7% 0.016* 12.4% 
Family Variables 0.022** 17.3% 0.021** 16.3% 0.009 7.1% 0.020** 15.9% 
Undergraduate Variables 0.015** 11.4% 0.015** 11.4% 0.010 7.5% 0.014** 11.1% 
Undergraduate GPA  -0.008** -6.4%  -0.010** -7.9% -0.005 -4.0% -0.009** -7.0% 
Quantitative GMAT 0.006 4.6% -0.007 -5.7% 0.030* 23.7% 0.004 3.3% 
Verbal GMAT 0.004 3.0% 0.005 4.0% 0.002 1.5% 0.004 3.1% 
MBA Variables 0.010 7.5% 0.009 7.1% 0.009 7.0% 0.009 6.8% 
MBA GPA 0.000 0.1% 0.002 1.8% -0.000 -0.1% 0.000 0.1% 
Current Job Characteristics 0.011* 8.7% 0.003 2.0% 0.023** 17.7% 0.011* 8.4% 
Noncognitive Skills 0.002 1.2% 0.001 0.4% -0.004 -2.8% 0.000 0.0% 
Confidence: Ability 0.006 4.8% 0.006 5.1% -0.006 -5.0% 0.005 4.1% 
Work/Life Preferences 0.001 0.5% 0.005 3.7% -0.011 -8.3% 0.000 0.0% 
Confidence: Admissions 0.000 0.0% 0.000 0.3% 0.001 0.7% 0.000 0.0% 
Confidence: Connections 0.004 2.9% 0.004 2.8% 0.003 2.2% 0.004 2.8% 
Managerial Goals 0.001 0.4% 0.000 0.0% 0.001 0.7% 0.001 0.4% 
Job Preferences 0.016** 12.8% 0.014** 10.9% 0.019** 14.7% 0.016** 12.6% 
Total 0.106 82.5% 0.070 54.9% 0.105** 82.4% 0.094 73.8% 
 
Notes:  For each variable or set of variables, reported are the net explained contribution of the raw wage gap and the percentage 
of the gap explained due to gender differences in values of each category of variables.  Gelbach decomposition follows Gelbach 
(2009). Each specification includes all of the variables from Table 1, and includes 933 observations.  ** and * indicate explained 




In addition to annual salary and hourly wages, we also use hours worked as our 
dependent variable, despite the relatively small hours gap of 1.32 hours per week 
(results available upon request).  Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions using pooled 
coefficients of the gender gap in either hours or log hours result in a total explained 
contribution of 41 to 42 percent of the gap.  With either hours or log hours under the 
full model, the categories of variables found to be statistically significant at the 5 
percent level were job characteristics, work/life preferences and family variables, 
whereas noncognitive skills and undergraduate GPA were significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
Second, although our sample is already fairly selective, including only recent 
MBAs working more than 35 hours per week, it may be possible that outliers with 
particularly high or low earnings affect our results.  To test this, we dropped from the 
sample individuals with the top and bottom 2 percent of earnings for both males and 
females and repeated our analysis.  The results were not meaningfully different (results 
available from authors upon request). 
Finally, the amount of the gender gap explained by particular variables may vary 
across salary ranges.  We use quantile regression to conduct this analysis.  







 percentile of earnings.  Interestingly, both the raw gap and the 
remaining unexplained gap are affected by location within the earnings distribution.  In 
particular, the largest raw gap, 18.7 percent, exists for ‗low earners‘, those at the 25
th
 
percentile, compared with 15.5 and 13.5 percent, for the 50
th
 and the 75
th
 percentiles.  






 percentile, 4.3 percent at the 50
th
 percentile, and only 1.3 percent at the 75
th
 
percentile.  Thus, the covariates do a better job of explaining earnings differences at the 
upper part of the distribution (about 96 percent of the raw gap).  That said, however, the 




2.VI  Discussion 
Three stark conclusions emerge from this study of how the gender earnings gap 
is affected by the inclusion of previously omitted variables, in a broad array of 
noncognitive skills, and in indicators of work/life preferences, using the GMAT 
Registrant Survey, a dataset especially rich in traditional human capital variables.  
First, statistically significant gender heterogeneity exists (at the 5 percent level) among 
7 of 15 self-reported noncognitive skills, one confidence measure, and among five labor 
market taste variables.
34
  Secondly, decomposition analysis reveals gender 
heterogeneity of factors significantly associated with the wage gap – with male 
coefficients used in Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions, the traditional human capital 
variables of employment experience, family variables, and undergraduate experiences
35
 
matter (but not with female coefficients), whereas current job characteristics matter 
                                                 
33. Notable exceptions are GMAT scores and MBA variables, which have a significant 
(decreasing) effect on the gap at the 75th percentile and very little effect at the 25th percentile. 
 
34. Among noncognitive skills, women self-reported more initiative, ethical behavior, 
communication skills, better ability to organize, motivate others and work with diversity.  Men 
reported greater shrewdness and ability to adapt theory to practice.  Among the labor market 
taste variables, women put more importance on relatives/friends, non-monetary job 
characteristics, and a job that contributes to society, whereas men placed more value on wealth.  
In addition, men exhibited greater confidence in doing well on the quantitative part of the 
GMAT.  
 
35. Notably, men‘s undergraduate experiences (institution quality, grades, and major 
among others), though not their MBA education, explain about 10 percent of the gender 




when female coefficients are used (but not with male coefficients).
36
  Finally, beyond a 
rich set of human capital variables, the noncognitive skills and work/life preference 
variables in our specification account for a quarter of the ―explained‖ gender wage gap, 
from 69 to 82 percent.  Our results, along with the other work connecting personality 
traits and preferences to earnings and with the growing gender heterogeneity literature, 
attempt to more fully measure ―individual abilities,‖ as envisioned in the original human 
capital model by Becker (1964). 
MBA women appear to incur penalties for ―good citizen‖ behavior, according to 
our findings and those of three other noncognitive skills-wage gap studies.  While we 
observe gender heterogeneity regarding numerous stereotyped variables, namely 
assertiveness, shrewdness, physical attractiveness, initiative, and the importance of 
wealth and friends, our decomposition results indicate that two novel variables with 
good citizen characteristics are associated with the male-female earnings gap: women‘s 
higher ethical standards and their priority for jobs that contribute to society.
37
  Other 
noncognitive skills-wage gap studies provide evidence that might similarly be construed 
as penalties for ―good citizen‖ behavior: wider gender wage gaps result from greater 
importance put on people and family (Fortin 2008)
38
 and higher female levels of 
agreeableness (Mueller and Plug 2006; Braakmann 2009).  Unlike Fortin‘s (2008) 
conclusion that men‘s greater priority of work and money helps account for the wage 
                                                 
36. This is akin to Semykina and Linz‘s (2007) findings that showed Russian women‘s, 
but not men‘s, personalities strongly affected their earnings. 
 
37. Job attributes and a smaller self-reported ability to adapt theory to practice by 
females are also significantly related to the gap.   
 
38. While we also find that women put significantly more importance on ―family and 
friends‖ (see Table 1), those priorities are not significantly associated with the gender wage gap 




gap, the MBA men and women in our sample place similar importance on career and 
although men place more importance on wealth that difference is not associated with the 
wage gap. 
Human capital models typically explain gender wage gaps as the consequence of 
females‘ lower human capital investment and reduced labor market attachment 
(Polachek 2006).  Although differences in MBA experiences do not help explain the 
earnings gap, the gap is importantly accounted for by males‘ college experiences and by 
their greater job tenure and work experience.
39
  Reduced labor market attachment, 
most importantly due to the presence of children, influences male-female wage gaps 
among Harvard undergraduates (Goldin and Katz 2008), University of Michigan 
lawyers (Noonan, Corcoran and Courant 2005), and University of Chicago MBAs 
(Bertrand et al. 2009).  In stark contrast with these three studies, married MBA women 
in our sample (who work at least 35 hours a week) suffer no wage penalties relative to 




Why do our results differ?  Since large gender disparities had already emerged 
by the third year after graduation for the University of Chicago MBAs (Bertrand et al. 
2009), the effect of the presence of children is not accounted for by our analysis ending 
3-4 years after obtaining the degree.  We can only speculate that for MBA women with 
degrees from typical MBA programs, having such education increased their 
                                                 
39. Females‘ lower tenure and experience explains 1.7 percentage points of the gap in 
our decompositions analysis, which is substantial and at least marginally significant (see Table 
7). 
 
40. In all decompositions, except the one where female coefficients are used, family 




intra-household earnings beyond the typical imbalance which often led women to bear 
greater household responsibilities.  So, despite the extraordinarily high mean female 
earnings of University of Chicago MBAs, those with less labor market attachment may 
have had husbands with even higher earnings.
 
 In addition, the Bertrand et al. (2009) 
analysis includes part-time workers (which were between two and five times more 
likely to be female, depending on the number of years since graduation), whereas our 
analysis focuses on full-time (35+ hours per week) workers. 
As scholars investigating educational and labor market outcomes
41
 continue to 
seek to remedy the call for missing data and unobserved heterogeneity with 
noncognitive variables, they face challenges.  First, no consensus exists about what 
constitutes noncognitive skills or how to measure them (see Borghans et al. 2008).  
Next, compared with the stability of cognitive ability (as of late adolescence), various 
noncognitive skills appear to evolve into middle age.  Thus, for example, it will be of 
great interest to determine the efficacy of the GRE‘s newly adopted noncognitive skills 
assessment (―Personal Potential Index‖) which the ETS thinks will make the test more 
relevant to business schools in predicting graduate school outcomes (De Vise 2009). 
Particular limitations of our analysis include the fact that the last survey 
occurred less than four years, on average, after completing the MBA program, when 
women‘s average age was 34 and men‘s 35.  Differences in lifetime returns by gender 
may vary substantially over a longer time frame, especially with the presence of 
children.  We should reiterate that we report estimated relationships between our novel 
variables (various confidence measures, a variety of work/life preferences, managerial 
                                                 
41. Regarding educational outcomes, see, for example, Carneiro and Heckman (2003) 
and for labor market outcomes, see, for example, Murnane, Willett, Braatz and Duhaldeborde 




expectations, and fifteen noncognitive skills, such as physical attractiveness, 
assertiveness, and initiative) and the gender pay gap, not causal links.  Regarding the 
quality and reliability of our data, while we use actual rather than self-reported GMAT 
scores, several other variables are self-reported.  Our data appropriately contains 
self-reported expectations and preferences (especially when they were reported prior to 
the observed earnings outcome).  However, regarding the 15 noncognitive managerial 
skills and attributes, it would be desirable to have both self-reported data, since 





A TAX AMNESTY IN THE CONTEXT OF 
A DEVELOPING ECONOMY 
3. I.  Introduction 
While tax amnesties have been used as a policy tool to increase revenue 
collection by many governments, they have generated mixed results: some have failed 
while others have succeeded.
1
 Why would a rational individual accept an amnesty and 
pay past dues?  Answers hitherto provided in the literature have focused on behavioral 
aspects of the delinquent taxpayer.
2
 
This paper takes a different and empirically relevant approach.  Following the 
observation that often successful amnesties have taken place in times of transition to 
prosperity, we provide a theoretical justification of this link.
3
  While the empirical 
connection has to be researched more carefully, we submit that, besides being based on 
evidence (albeit perhaps anecdotal), our analysis raises the possibility that economic 
liberalization is an important factor to consider when determining the timing of a tax 
                                                 
       
1
 European (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland among others) as well as South American countries 
(Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru among others), India, and the majority of US states 
have used tax amnesties of some form to increase tax revenue. 
 
2
 For example unanticipated regret (Malik and Schwab; 1991) or risk aversion 
(Andreoni; 1991).  
 
3
 For example, Uchitelle (1989) mentions, Ireland (in 1988) and Colombia (in 1988) as 
cases of successful amnesties – in each case these took place in times of growth and trade 
liberalization. The same connection holds for the Indian tax amnesties of 1975 and 1997 that are 
generally considered to be successful (see Das-Gupta et. al (1995) regarding the 1975 amnesty). 
From 1975 to 1976 India improved its trade balance from -286 Million to +787 Million 
US-Dollars, showing a drastic change in economic conditions.  1997 is well known to be a 
period of liberalization (see http://indiabudget.nic.in/es97-98/chap22.pdf for  an overview of 





amnesty.  Specifically, we show that such an amnesty will generate response, even if 
enforcement activities remain unchanged, and develop conditions under which the 
amnesty results in higher tax collection. 
 
 3. II Tax Compliance without Amnesty  
Consider risk-neutral agents, each with an identical project that has a two period 
life, and yields the net income Y in each period.
4
  An agent is required to register her 
business with the appropriate Tax Authority (TA) and pay an income tax.  We assume, 
for simplicity, that any tax evasion by a registered project is detected by the TA with 
probability 1. In other words, registration results in subsequent ``visibility`` that 
compels all registered projects to be legal; agents that choose to evade taxes also do not 
register. The legal or formal sector is the collection of all registered and tax-compliant 
businesses. The unregistered agents function in the underground or informal sector and 
are more difficult to trace. Let m denote the probability of detecting an agent‘s present 
period violations in the informal sector.   
Suppose an agent is apprehended for non-compliance in period 2.  The 
investigation may uncover her past period violations (if any).  We denote µ (where 0 < 
µ < 1) to be the probability of revelation of an agent‘s past violation, given her detection 
in the informal sector in the present period. In a similar vein, we also assume that past 
violations of a currently legal (and registered) agent may be detected with the same 
                                                 
4
 We avoid incorporating risk aversion, or other psychological/behavioral aspects, such 
as feelings of guilt, so as not to confuse our analysis with factors that earlier papers have 







  Since past violations may be easier to detect once an agent is already 
under inspection (or registered and visible, in terms of her record), it is reasonable to 
assume that µ > m. For ease of exposition, we assume the tax and the fine to be 
proportional to Y.  If caught, an agent is forced to pay the fine fY in addition to her 
outstanding taxes, tY. 
  Suppose that an agent has not paid her taxes in period 1. We assume, reasonably, 
that detection in period 1 implies mandatory registration (and therefore compliance) in 
period 2, 
6
   If the agent escapes detection,    her expected payoff in period 2 is Y – 
m(1 + µ)(t + f)Y if she evades taxes a second time.
7
  If she decides to be compliant in 
period 2, and moves to the formal sector, her expected payoff is (1 – t)Y - µ(t + f)Y.   




    m <  
 
          
         (A.1)
  
                                                 
5
 Thus the joint probability of detection of prior period tax evasion is mµ for an 
informal sector agent.  For a formal sector agent, this probability is simply µ, since her 
probability of detection of present offences is 1(in a sense, the registered agent is always under 
observation).  Assuming a different probability of detection of prior offences for the registered 
agent does not change the nature of results, and only complicates the algebra. 
  
6
 Relaxing this assumption to one where an agent penalized for period 1 violation, can 
become incognito in period 2, and thus able to violate again, makes no difference to our analysis 




 With probability m she is penalized for her present violations; mµ is the joint 






   µ ≥ 
 
   
            (A.2)
     
 
 
As the appendix demonstrates, (A.1) is both necessary and sufficient to ensure 
tax evasion as the benchmark case.  That this is predominantly the characteristic 
feature of the informal (or illegal) sector, and that the purpose of the amnesty is to 
encourage businesses to register and emerge out of the underground economy, is an 
observable fact abundantly borne out by journalistic and anecdotal observations.  As 
the next section will show, (A.2) is necessary to ensure the acceptability of a tax 
amnesty in period 2. 
 
Proposition 1:  Given (A.1), agents choose to be in the informal sector (or the 
underground economy) in period 1 and, if undetected, remain so and non-compliant in 
period 2.  Agents are compliant in period 2 only if detected and compelled to register in 
period 1. 
 
Proof: See appendix.         







3.III   Tax Amnesty in Times of Prosperity  
Suppose that an agent‘s income increases to Y + θ at the beginning of period 2 
due to the positive effects of liberalization, and that, simultaneously, the regulator 
declares an amnesty.  Agents who take the amnesty only need to pay outstanding taxes, 
and register their business in period 2.  We further suppose that benefits from 
liberalization are available only in the formal or legal sector of the economy.  Such an 
assumption is quite reasonable. The import and purchase of new and productive 
technology, or access to improved infrastructure may only be possible through legal and 
visible channels; foreign direct investments may not want to operate in the informal 
sector because of problems of enforceability of contracts.  The increment θ, as well as 
the amnesty, is assumed to be completely unanticipated (or unexpected) in period 1.
8
   
It is easy to see that, in the absence of non-linearities, partial compliance is never 
optimal in our model: the agent will either pay no taxes at all or pay them in full. With 
complete lack of anticipation of either the increase in income, or the amnesty, the 
agent‘s period 1 decision is the same as before, that is she decides not to pay taxes.  Her 
optimal decision in period 2 depends on the relative magnitudes of three alternative 
payoffs: 




                       (1) 
                                                 
8
 Our results are robust to assuming that, in period 1, an agent expects a period 2 
increment of θ with probability p.  The additional algebra that verifies this is available upon 








                       (2)
   
 
 
The agent, however, may decide to move to the formal sector and earn Y + θ.  Then, 




    (1 – t)(Y + θ) - µ(t + f)Y     (3)
   
 
 
Comparing (1) to (3) we see that (A.2) implies that accepting the amnesty is 
superior to moving to the legal sector without making use of the amnesty offer.  A 




                                                 
 
9





       θ1   
              
   




Thus, the availability of new and enhanced opportunities in the formal sector 
must be significant enough to make a tax amnesty viable.  Note that, for this outcome to 
hold, the probability of detection of past violations, at least in the formal sector, should 
be ―sufficiently high‖.  However, the detection probabilities need not be high enough to 
ensure compliance in the absence of amnesty, as is the case in our model. 
 
Proposition 2:  Given (A.2), an unanticipated tax amnesty, declared at a time of 
liberalization and rising productivity, is successful only if liberalization has a positive 




Proof:  Follows from the above analysis.     // 
 
3.IV   Amnesty and the Tax Authority’s Revenue 
In the absence of an amnesty, but with the gains from liberalization, the payoff 
(1) is no longer available to the agent. Comparing (2) and (3), it is easy to show that an 
agent finds it optimal to move to the formal sector, post liberalization, if θ ≥ θ2, where 
 
                                                 
10
 Thus, the absence of liberalization, equivalent to assuming θ = 0, implies that a tax 





         
                    
   




Otherwise, she remains in the informal sector. Note that (A.2) implies that θ2 ˃ θ1.  
If θ ϵ (θ1, θ2), agents who were not apprehended in period 1 remain in the informal sector 
in period 2, and forego the gains from liberalization if no amnesty is offered.  In this 
case, a tax amnesty increases the revenue collected by the TA: (A.1) implies that t > 




    m(1+ )(t+f)Y < 2tY + tθ      (6) 
 
 
    
The L.H.S. of (6) represents the revenue from fines collected in the absence of the tax 
amnesty, while the R.H.S. is the revenue generated from those who accept the amnesty.
 If θ ≥ θ2, the TA`s expected revenue is t(Y + θ) +  (t + f)Y if no amnesty is 







    t(Y + θ) +  (t + f)Y ≥  2tY + tθ     (7) 
 
 
   
and declaration of amnesty does not lead to higher revenues.  Consequently, as we 
demonstrate in the appendix, the success of a tax amnesty - in terms of revenue for the 





Proposition 3:  From the TA’s point of view, an amnesty is successful (results in higher 
revenue) only if the proportion of low type agents (those who benefit moderately from 
liberalization) is high enough relative to the high type agents (those who gain 
substantially from liberalization. 
 
Proof:  See appendix.         
 // 
 
3.IV   Conclusions 
The above sections demonstrate that a tax amnesty that is timed to coincide with 
liberalization and rising incomes can be successful, both in terms of participation and 
revenues collected, if the gains from liberalization are within an appropriate range.  
This success is despite the fact that the enforcement efforts by the Tax Authority remain 
                                                 
11
 Overall welfare increases with a tax amnesty if at least 1 low type agent is present, 





unchanged for the previous levels that were inadequate to generate compliance.  Our 


























THE EFFECTS OF WAGE VOLATILITY ON GROWTH 
 
4.I  Introduction 
Why do some countries grow faster than others? Over the last decades, it 
became clear that there is not one standardized answer to this question. An economy 
needs a combination of factors and for different countries and regions a different set of 
conditions may have to hold in order to foster growth.
1
 However, the benchmark list of 
growth determinants, shared by most growing economies, is rather short. According to 
Mirestean and Tsangarides (2010), it consists only of debt, openness, inflation, initial 
income, investment, life expectancy, and population growth. 
This paper examines the impact of another candidate of growth determinants: 
volatility in wages. To my knowledge, no paper has tackled this issue before and 
currently, there exists no clear consensus regarding the effect of various sorts of 
volatility on growth. Posch and Waelde (2009) argue that no causality at all runs from 
volatility to growth. Turnovsky and Chattopadhyay (2003) analyze developing 
economies and find that both monetary and terms of trade volatility affect growth 
negatively in small stochastic open economies. Similarly, Ramey and Ramey (1995) 
find negative effects of growth volatility itself on growth, mainly stemming from the 
volatility of innovations to growth, which they interpret as reflecting uncertainty. In 
contrast to these findings, Devereux and Smith (1994) suggest that international risk 
                                                 
1
 For a discussion of various possible sources of growth see, for instance, Barro and Lee 
(1994), Alesina et al. (1996), Barro (1996, 1997), or Frankel and Romer (1999) among many 
others. For good summaries, although a bit dated, refer to Temple (1999), Durlauf and Quah 




sharing – which means a lower volatility -- in terms of portfolio choices reduces 
precautionary savings, which in turn lowers growth. Thus, arguments for both negative 
and positive effects of different kinds of volatility on growth can be found in the 
literature. 
In a related context, Rodrik (1998) concludes that external risk, measured as the 
volatility of income associated with fluctuations in the external terms of trade, 
encourages people to call for a stronger public safety net and/or seek a job with the 
government, which is considered a safer source of income. Hence, private sector wage 
risk could be a determinant of government size and -- following previous literature such 
as Barro and Lee (1994) -- government size in turn affects growth.
2
 
This paper merges the literatures on the connections from volatility to growth 
and to government size. I develop a model that first determines the number of people 
working in the public sector (as opposed to the riskier private sector) and then analyzes 
how volatility of private sector wages affects growth. The model suggests that volatility 
has both a direct (positive) effect on growth, but also an indirect (negative) effect on 
growth through the mediating role of government size. Intuitively, the direct effect is a 
result of precautionary savings, whereas the indirect effect works through the 
composition of the labor market. More risk in the private market leads workers to switch 
to public jobs, therefore increasing the size of government. 
Following the model is the empirical analysis on a panel of 19 countries, which 
tests for the existence of both the direct and the indirect effect. I use a 3SLS approach to 
determine growth and government size simultaneously, thus controlling for the 
                                                 
2
 Regarding determinants of government size, see for instance Alesina and Wacziarg 




suggested endogeneity between growth and government size and a possible correlation 
of the error terms. The results provide strong evidence for my theoretical implications as 
both the direct and the indirect effect remain significant for various sets of controls. In 
addition, the results remain robust to different detrending methods and alternative 
measures of government size. 
The next Section develops the theoretical model, pointing out the opposing 
direct and indirect effects of wage volatility on growth. Section 3 discusses the 
empirical analysis, consisting of methodology, a description of the data, the main 
results, and various robustness tests. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper with a brief 
summary of results and possible implications. 
 
4.II   The Model 
4.II.A  The Economy 
Imagine an economy where time is continuous consisting of 2 sectors: the public 
sector produces the public good, and the private sector produces the private good. The 
public good only requires labor as an input in production, whereas the private good 
requires labor and capital. As in Rodrik (1998), the technology in the public sector is 
riskless, as opposed to the technology needed to produce the private good, which is 
subject to uncertainty. Let the population consist of a continuum of agents of total size 1 
with each agent having an infinite planning horizon. The fraction of workers employed 
in the public sector,  , is determined endogenously. Consequently,     is the 
fraction of private sector workers. At the beginning of time, workers commit to working 




utilities from working in either sector -- a decision which in part depends on the wage in 
the stochastic private sector, in comparison to the riskless public sector wage. 
 
4.II.B  Production and Wages 




     
        (1) 
 
   
 
where I assume diminishing marginal returns,      . Public sector wages are 




                                  















                      (3) 
 
 
                                   
where     , the private sector wage, which follows a Brownian motion with a 




                (4)
                                   
 
 
where   stands for a normal Wiener process.4 
                                                 
3
 Rodrik (1998) employs a general production function of which this is a special case. 
Even though allowing capital to perfectly substitute for labor is not necessarily realistic, it is 




 This production function is a stochastic version of famous works in growth theory, 
like Romer (1986) or Jones and Manuelli (1990). Similar to Smith (1998), the stochastic 
variable follows a Brownian motion. A drawback here is the theoretical possibility of the wage 
becoming negative -- a problem which is well-known in the literature. For a good discussion of 




4.II.C  Growth 
Workers are assumed to be identical and own the same initial wealth,      , 
with        , and            . Consequently, total societal wealth consists of 
                       at any point in time.
5
 Further, denote    as the 
consumption of one public worker and similarly    as a private worker's consumption. 








                    (5)
                          
 
 
Notice that the government remains unproductive, as is common in most growth 
models -- only production of the private good contributes to growth. One could see the 
public good as spent by the government to maintain the infrastructure, as in Turnovsky 
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4.II.D  The Workers' Decisions 
In this simple model, workers exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) 
and make their decision about where to work irreversibly at the beginning of time.
6
 In 




          




   
          (6)    








   
  




with        .   stands for the agents' rate of time preference and   
represents absolute risk aversion. To conclude with assumptions, workers are able to 
                                                 
 
6
 If wage is random, this is a classic problem in precautionary savings. It is well known 




borrow and lend at a riskless rate,  , in this economy. Now, I turn to the endogenous 
determination of the optimal consumption in both sectors, calculate the equilibrium in 
the labor market, and finally analyze how volatility affects growth. 
 
4.II.D.1  Working for the Government 





          














   
  








Notice that the agent contemplating a government position only faces one state 
variable, wealth   . In the appendix, I show detailed derivations of the Bellman 






    
  
   
  
         (10)
   
 
 
Hence, consumption of a public sector worker is a linear function of wealth and 
wage, with an intercept determined by her rate of time preference in combination with 
the return to capital and her value of risk aversion. To assess the overall benefit from 





            
 
   
 
               
  
  (11)
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 To solve the maximization problems in both sectors, I use the concept of dynamic 
programming (Merton, 1971), which allows us to analyze optimal continuous-time dynamic 
models under uncertainty. For detailed derivations of the following results plus the 




(11) measures the expected future utility of pursuing the optimal savings path, 
evaluated at time zero. As we will see, the value function will become important for the 
determination of the equilibrium in the labor market. 
 
4.II.D.2  Working in the Private Sector 
The consideration of a job in the private market is slightly more complicated, 
since, in addition to wealth   , the agent also faces a stochastic private wage,   , as a 
state variable. In particular, an agent contemplating a private sector job faces the 
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which is a standard precautionary savings model in continuous time. Using the 




    
  
   
  
 
   
  
         (14)
   
 
 
with consumption being a linear function of wealth and wage, equivalent to the 
public sector wage. Only the intercept behaves differently compared to the public 
sector: the entire consumption profile shifts down by a risk premium for working in the 
stochastic private sector, 
   
  
. Thus, uncertainty causes consumers to save more at any 
point in time.  
 
Again, the expected lifetime benefit of working in the private sector is given by 




                  
 
   
 
 
    
  







4.II.E  Equilibrium in the Labor Market 
At time zero, workers compare the lifetime utility from working in either sector. 
Naturally, an agent moves to the sector which gives her the highest expected lifetime 











Using this condition in combination with the value functions (11) and (15) 
allows me to solve for the equilibrium in the labor market. The equilibrium share of 






      
 
     




         (17)
   
                                                 
8
 In equilibrium, wages equal the marginal product. Similarly, the interest rate is equal 
to the marginal product of capital when the bond market is in equilibrium:    . 
 
9
 Note that the difference between the private and the public wage is exactly the 
volatility term, a risk premium for working in the private sector:       






In fact, 2 possible equilibria spring from (2.5)
10
: 
• If        
   
  
, then     . If the public wage is very high and/or the 
volatility of private wages is very high, then everybody works for the 
government. 
• If        
   
  
, then       . This is the diversified equilibrium 
stemming from incomplete specialization. 
Since the first equilibrium presents a relatively unrealistic corner solution (in 
practice, people work in both sectors), the following analysis focuses on the diversified 
equilibrium. Notice from (17) that    is an increasing function of 
   
  
, as risk aversion 
induces people to value the safer public sector more, when uncertainty in the private 
market increases. Similarly, 
   
  
   since a higher production parameter for the public 
good,  , increases the public wage and therefore the public workforce. Finally, (17) is 
decreasing in     , asserting that a higher starting wage in the private sector decreases 
the public sector workforce. 
 
PROPOSITION 1. A higher volatility of private sector wages increases the 
share of people working for the government. 
 
Given the mixed equilibrium in the labor market, I now examine how volatility 
in the private sector affects growth. 
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     is excluded by the assumption of diminishing marginal returns in the public 
sector,      . Similarly, the fact that wages have to be positive is implied:      






4.II.F  The Effects of Wage Volatility on Growth 
Given   
 ,   
 , and    from (10), (14), and (17), it is now easy to determine the 








   
  
               
   
   
  




From here, how does an increase in    affect growth? Differentiating (18) with 









   




   
   
       
   
  
   (19)
   
 
 
The first term indicates the positive direct effect on growth caused by lower 
consumption of private sector workers: the higher volatility of their wage encourages 
them to save more. The second term summarizes both components of the negative 




market: (1)   
   
   
       is the wage for workers switching from the productive 
private sector to the unproductive public job.  (2) Since these job-switching workers 
now earn a riskless wage, there is no incentive for precautionary savings anymore 
  
   
   




PROPOSITION 2. A higher volatility of private sector wages has both a direct 
(positive) and an indirect (negative) effect on growth. The direct effect is caused by 
lower consumption of private sector workers, whereas the indirect effect comes from a 
change in the composition of the labor market: some workers switch to the unproductive 
-- but safe -- public sector, making precautionary savings obsolete for them. 
 
Overall, this model predicts an ambiguous net effect of private wage volatility 
on growth since the direct and indirect effect point in opposite directions. The empirical 
part of the paper will now try to determine the validity of the above predictions. 
 
4.III  Empirical Analysis 
4.III.A  Methodology 
Following the implications from (19), I expect private wage volatility to have 
direct and indirect effects on growth, where the indirect channel works through the size 
of the public sector. The direct effect is relatively easy to measure by regressing growth 
on wage variance, controlling for other growth determinants. The indirect effect is 
slightly more complex to analyze: First, I regress government size on wage variance to 




determinants of government size. Second, I add government size as a covariate in the 
growth regression to see whether government size affects growth, too. Empirically, the 




                  
                                     








                
                                                




where     ,         ,      , and          represent the excess volatility 
of private sector wages, the growth rate, government size, and the unemployment rate. 




growth is captured by   , whereas the indirect effect is expressed by the combination of 
  , the impact of wage variance on government size, and   , the effect of government 
size on growth. Hence, the indirect effect exists only if I can reject the Null Hypothesis 
of              .          contains notorious growth determinants: life 
expectancy, fertility, openness, GDP per capita, investment per capita, and inflation.
11
 
      , the vector of controls shared by both equations, contains country fixed effects, 
time fixed effects, a linear and a quadratic time trend, and a country-specific time trend. 
Each of them will be included in turn as controls in various specifications. As mentioned 
in the introduction, different countries may react differently to potential growth 
determinants (but also to potential determinants of government size). Similarly, 
different years in my sample may experience exogenous shocks (for instance a global 
recession). Hence, fixed effects are intended to pick up any time- and country-invariant 
aspects. Finally, although not necessarily part of a usual growth equation, the 
unemployment rate may be of specific interest here: as the labor market is a driving part 
of the model, I want to ensure that wage volatility does not pick up effects resulting 
from the unemployment rate.
12
 
The simultaneous nature of the equations --       appears on the RHS in (20), 
                                                 
11
 Following recommendations from Temple (1999) and others, I use lagged values of 
the explanatory variables in order to deal with a simultaneity problem prevalent in the growth 
literature. Durlauf et al. (2004) give a good summary of instrumental variables in their 
appendices 3 and 4, where lagged values for (i) investment from Bond et al. (2004), (ii) inflation 
from Li and Zou (2002), (iii) trade as share of GDP (openness) from Edwards (1998) and 
Amable(2000), and (iv) GDP from Rousseau (2002) among others are mentioned. Finally, due 
to data availability, a few notable growth determinants are absent in my analysis: the real 
exchange rate, debt, rule of law, economic freedom, democracy vs. autocracy, and a 
measurement for schooling. As my data contains mostly developed countries, most of these 
variables may not be too relevant; country- and time-fixed effects should pick up most of their 
contribution to growth here. 
 
12




while          enters the RHS of (21) -- prevents me from applying an OLS 
framework. However, both equations are identified as there exist unique dependent 
variables for either regression:         ,              , and               predict 
           , but are not determinants of government size; similarly,            and 
           are significant predictors of      , but not growth.
13
 Those additional 
controls implicitly serve as instruments for the corresponding equations, that could be 
estimated in a 2SLS framework. Finally, I suspect that omitted variables could affect 
both equations, leading to a possible correlation of the error terms      and     . Thus, in 
order to control for correlation of the error terms, I incorporate the seemingly unrelated 
regression equations model (SUR) to extend the 2SLS to a 3SLS model. 
 
4.III.B  Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 8 summarizes the initial data set of 608 observations from 19 countries. 
Most of them were considered developed economies at the time of observation, setting 
this data set apart from others such as Turnovsky et al. (2003), who specifically analyze 
developing countries.
14
 Table 9 provides a summary of all variables used and their 
method of computation.  The most important variable of my analysis is also the most 
difficult one to compute: private sector wage volatility. I detrend time series of wages 
for each individual country, using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.  
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 Correlation coefficients indicate that this choice is reasonable (not displayed here, 
but coefficients are available at request). Lagged values of government size are highly 
correlated with current government size, but not with growth; the respective argument holds for 
lagged values of growth. 
 
14










    
 
 Table 8: Country Statistics 
 
 





1984 – 2008 
 
25 
Austria 1976 – 2009 34 
Belgium 1970 – 2009 40 
Canada 1970 – 2006 37 
Denmark 1970 – 2009 40 
Finland 1970 – 2009 40 
France 1970 – 2008 39 
Germany 1970 – 2009 40 
Italy 1970 – 2009 40 
Japan 1970 – 2008 39 
Korea 1985 – 2008 24 
Netherlands 1970 – 2009 40 
Norway 1970 – 2009 40 
Poland 1992 – 2008 17 
Slovak Republic 1994 – 2009 16 
Spain 1980 – 2009 30 
Sweden 1993 – 2009 17 
United  Kingdom 1970 – 2009 40 








Several steps are necessary in order to obtain a final measurement of private 
sector wage volatility: 
1.  The OECD statistics provide an index of ``Business Sector Labor 




of private sector wages (  ).
15
 In order to prepare this data for the Hodrick-Prescott 
decomposition, I apply the natural logarithm to each observation. 
2.  The Hodrick-Prescott filter decomposes each country's time series (  ) into 
a trend (  ) and a cycle (  ).
16
 Squaring the cycle term provides a measurement for the 
volatility of private sector wages (   ) for each observation. 
3.  Since public sector wages may not always be an entirely riskless source of 
income (as assumed in the theoretical part), one needs to control for the volatility of 
public sector wages. In the absence of exact data on public sector wages, I choose an 
index of ``Total Economy Labor Compensation per Employee'' as a proxy for public 
sector wages (  ).
17
 With this data, steps 1 and 2 are repeated in order to obtain a 
measurement for public sector wage volatility (   ). 
4.  The difference between the volatility of private sector wages (   ) and the 
volatility of public sector wages (   ) results in a measurement for the excess wage 
volatility in the private sector:      
 
   
  in (20) and (21). 
The growth rate (Growth Rate of Real GDP Laspeyres per capita), government 
size (Government Share of Real GDP per capita), openness, GDP (Laspeyres per 
                                                 
15
 One shortcoming of this analysis is the exclusion of the agricultural sector in private 
wages. However, country- and time-fixed effects should be able to control for this shortcoming 
for the most part. 
 
16
 I use a value of         for the Hodrick-Prescott filter, as is common in the 
literature. One main concern of decomposing time series is the end-of-sample problem: 
observations close to the end (the beginning) of each series might be biased as data is only 
available for the past (the future). Following Watson (2007), I use an AR(1) growth rate model 
and extend each series by 4 data points in both directions before applying the filter. 
 
17
 Even though private compensation is included here as well, it constitutes only a part 
of this index. Hence, a change in the volatility of private wages, holding everything else 
constant, will have a bigger effect on business sector labor compensation. The volatility of 




capita), and investment (Investment Share of Real GDP per capita) are taken from the 
Penn World Table 6.3. In my main specifications, I convert government share per capita 
to government expenditure per capita as a measurement for government size. The same 
rationale applies to investment.
18
 The fertility rate (births per woman) and life 
expectancy at birth are part of the World Development Indicators from the World Bank, 
whereas the inflation rate (CPI percentage change from the previous period) and the 
unemployment rate come from the OECD statistics. Due to the use of 2 lags in 
government size and growth and the occasional missing data point for various control 
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1. Ln(Business  Sector Wages) 
(w̃2 ) (0.04) 0.223  2. Decomposition  of Wages  (λH P  = 100) for 
 each country  time series separately 
3. Repeating  steps  1 and  2 for total  
economy wages 
4. Squared  cycle  term  from  step  2 
(w̃2 )  –  squared  cycle term  from step 
3 (w̃2 ) = excess volatility  of private  
sector wages (w̃2 ) 
 
Growth  Rate 0.025 -0.098 605 (Growth  Rate  Laspeyres per capita)/100 








605 Ln[(Gov‘t Share per capita/100)∗(GDP 











































Ln(GDP per capita) 








623 Ln[(Investment  Share  per  
capita/100)∗(GDP 










(Inflation  Rate)/100 



















Table 10 displays the main results, where control variables are added 
subsequently moving from left to right. The main rows of interest are the first 2 of the 
growth regression (the direct effect of volatility on growth and the second part of the 
indirect effect: the effect of government size on growth) and the first row of the 
regression predicting government size (the first part of the indirect effect: the effect of 
wage volatility on government size). Column (1) shows the basic 3SLS system of 
equations with only lagged values of growth and government size and country fixed 
effects as control variables. The direct effect is confirmed as volatility positively affects 
growth -- a result that is significant at the 5 percent level. Also, the indirect effect 
receives support -- even at the 1 percent level -- as both stages are significant: wage 
volatility has a positive effect on government size and government size affects growth in 
a negative way. Specification (2) adds life expectancy and fertility as controls into the 
growth equation, but both effects of volatility on growth remain significant. Column (3) 
adds time fixed effects, which again does not change the significance of both the direct 
and indirect effect. Next, the addition of both a linear and a quadratic time trend in 
specification (4) leaves the coefficients of interest untouched in terms of significance. 
Column (5) then includes more growth determinants (openness, GDP, investment, and 
inflation) and, after removing time trends, a country-specific time trend is added. Here 
again, the results support the theory: both the direct and the indirect effect remain 










Dependent Variable: Growtht 
 












Government Sizet -0.02** -0.01* -0.03** -0.03** -0.04* -0.05* 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.024) (0.028) 
Growth  Ratet−1 0.30** 0.37** 0.37** 0.36** 0.31** 0.39** 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.037) (0.040) 
Growth  Ratet−2 -0.08** -0.11** -0.06 -0.14** -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.037) (0.041) 














Opennesst−1     0.01 0.00 
     (0.014) (0.016) 












Unemployment Ratet−1      -0.10* 
      (0.056) 
R2  0.267 0.274 0.516 0.286 0.423 0.451 
 
Dependent Variable : Government Sizet 
 












Government Sizet−1 1.19** 1.18** 1.15** 1.16** 1.05** 1.02** 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.040) 
Government Sizet−2 -0.21** -0.21** -0.18** -0.19** -0.18** -0.16** 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.034) (0.039) 
Growth  Ratet 0.17 0.13 0.30** 0.11 -0.11 -0.02 
 (0.119) (0.105) (0.110) (0.102) (0.072) (0.082) 
Unemployment Ratet−1      -0.06 
(0.043) 
R2  0.998 0.997 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 
 













Time Fixed Effects No No Yes No No No 
Time Trend No No No Yes No No 















Notes:  Standard errors are given in parentheses. ** and * indicate statistically 
significant at the 5 and 10 percent level.  Time trend includes a linear and a quadratic 
time trend. 




not affect the main coefficients of interest: both the direct and the indirect effect of wage 
volatility on growth remain significant. 
In summary, the empirical analysis provides strong evidence for the existence of 
both effects of wage volatility on growth: the positive direct effect and the negative 
indirect effect remain significant throughout all specifications. The upcoming 
robustness section specifically analyzes whether any of the results are driven by either 
the method chosen to decompose wages or the specific measurement used for 
government size. 
 
4.III.D  Robustness Tests 
Table 11 displays a variety of robustness tests to see whether the obtained results 
are owed to either the choice of     for the Hodrick-Prescott filter, the method of 
decomposing wages, or the specific measurement of government size. Again, the first 2 
rows in the growth regression and the first row of the regression estimating government 
size show the main coefficients of interest for the direct and the indirect effect of wage 

















Gov‘t Size and 
 Detrending Investment in Shares 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Growtht 
 
Wage Volatilityt−1 0.07* 0.07 0.02* 0.02** 0.03* 0.03** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) 
Government Sizet -0.05* -0.05** -0.05* -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.022) (0.024) 
Growth  Ratet−1 0.31** 0.39** 0.31** 0.39** 0.32** 0.37** 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040) 
Growth  Ratet−2 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.03 
 (0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.040) (0.036) (0.038) 
Opennesst−1 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) 
GDPt−1 -0.07** -0.10** -0.07* -0.10** -0.14** -0.18** 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.021) (0.025) 
Investmentt−1 -0.03** -0.04** -0.03** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) 
Inflationt−1 -0.14** -0.18** -0.14** -0.18** -0.13** -0.16** 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.029) 
Unemployment Ratet−1  -0.10*  -0.12**  -0.07 
  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.052) 
R2  0.422 0.448 0.422 0.451 0.499 0.531 
 
Dependent Variable: Government Sizet 
 












Government Sizet−1 1.04** 1.01** 1.04** 1.01** 0.95** 0.94** 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.040) (0.027) (0.031) 
Government Sizet−2 -0.17** -0.15** -0.17** -0.15** -0.11** -0.11** 
 (0.034) (0.040) (0.034) (0.040) (0.027) (0.030) 
Growth  Ratet -0.11 -0.01 -0.11 -0.02 -0.88** -0.85** 
 (0.072) (0.082) (0.072) (0.082) (0.077) (0.082) 
Unemployment Ratet−1  -0.06  -0.06  0.01 
  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.055) 
R2  0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.994 0.994 
 
Observations  586 513 586 513 586 513 
 
Notes:  Standard errors are given in parentheses. ** and * indicate statistically significant at the 
5 and 10 percent level.  Specifications (1) and (2):  a  value of          for the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter is used. In (3) and (4), quadratic detrending is u s e d  to decompose wages.  
Specifications (5) and (6) use the natural log of Government Share per capita and Investment 
Share per capita to generate the variables Government Size and Investment, respectively.  All 
specifications include country fixed effects and country-specific time trends. 




Hodrick-Prescott filter when dealing with annual data, it may be interesting to see 
whether using another value for     to detrend wages generates the same results in 
terms of significance. The main results from Table 2 use the most common value of 
        for annual data (for instance Backus and Kehoe (1992)), but Ravn and 
Uhlig (2002) suggest         . Thus, specification (1) shows the main result from 
column (5) in Table 3 for         , confirming the significance of both the direct 
and the indirect effect. Specification (2) adds the unemployment rate and is the only 
regression returning one barely insignificant coefficient: the direct effect slips out of the 
ten-percent significance range here. Second, the Hodrick-Prescott filter in general has 
been the subject of debate.
19
 In order to control for the specific method of detrending 
wages, specifications (3) and (4) display regression results from using quadratic 
detrending on the wage data at hand. Still, the difference between the squared cycle 
terms of business sector and total economy wages represents the measurement of 
private sector wage volatility -- only with the difference that instead of the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter, I use quadratic detrending. All results tell the same story as 
before: both the direct and the indirect effect remain significant in their determination of 
growth. Here, the addition of the unemployment rate as a control in both equations even 
strengthens both effects. 
Third, in my main results I define       as government expenditure per capita 
(and similarly investment per capita as investment) which may be driving results. Do 
results also hold with       defined as government share of GDP per capita? 
Specifications (5) and (6) display results when using the natural logarithm of 
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government share of GDP per capita (and also the investment share of GDP per capita as 
a control variable in the growth regression). Here again, all necessary coefficients carry 
the expected signs and are significant. 
In summary, the main results in table 10 do not appear to be driven by (1) the 
specific value of    , (2) the method of detrending or (3) the measurement of 
government size. Only a different choice of     makes the direct effect of wage 
volatility on growth barely insignificant in one specification. 
 
4.IV  Conclusions 
This paper (1) provides an explanation for the question how wage volatility 
affects growth and (2) suggests an answer to the question why previous research did not 
find a clear consensus regarding the effect of volatility on growth. 
My theoretical model predicts two channels in which wage volatility affects 
growth: a positive direct and a negative indirect effect. Intuitively, the direct effect 
stems from increased precautionary savings (equivalent to less consumption) by 
workers in response to more income risk. The indirect effect comes from a change in the 
composition of the labor market: some workers move to the unproductive public sector 
after private sector wages become more volatile. In the second half of the paper, the 
analysis of 608 observations across 19 countries provides strong empirical evidence for 
both the direct and the indirect effect of private sector wage volatility on growth. Thus, 
if an analysis does not recognize both opposing effects, but rather tests only a direct 
effect of wage volatility on growth, the net result is ambiguous: depending on which 




observed. Although specific to wage volatility, this analysis may inspire further 
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Proof of proposition 1:  Comparing the payoffs   –                  
and   –      –          , it is easy to see that, if the agent has been undetected in 
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Next, suppose that the agent is compliant in period 1.  In period 2, compliance 
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            (2.A)
  
 
      
the agent will be a violator in period 2.  Note that the R.H.S. of (1.A) is strictly greater 




period 2, irrespective of her decisions in period 1. 
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The L.H.S. of the above inequality represents the expected payoff from non-compliance 
in period 1. If she is non-compliant, then, with probability m she will be audited, and is 
subsequently compliant in period 2.  With probability (1 – m) on the other hand, she 
avoids detection in period 1, and finds it optimal to remain non-compliant in period 2. It 




    m < 
 
          
           (4.A) 
                                                 
1
 If we do not assume that a violator apprehended in period 1 has to be registered and 
compliant in period 2,  given (2.A), the only change in the above proof is that (3.A) changes to   
                         –     –                –       
        




both (3.A) and (2.A) are satisfied, and the agent will be a tax evader in period 1, and, if 
not detected, remains so in period 2.       
   // 
 
Proof of proposition 3:   Assume that there are two types of agents distinguished 
by their gains from liberalization.  Specifically, we assume that ni is the number of the 








Then, a tax amnesty increases the revenue collected from each type L, and lowers the 
revenue from each type H agent. For an overall increase in revenue to the TA from the 
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As the above conditions imply, the proportion of low types need to be ―appropriately 
high‖ for the amnesty to result in higher revenues for the TA.   







Working for the Government  
To solve the agents' maximization problem, the Bellman equation presents a 
common method to address dynamic programming problems. In the public sector, the 




               
     
 
         









       






As a next step, an 'educated guess' (in this case one might assume that the state 
variable    exhibits similar properties than the choice variable   ) provides a possible 




              










                








       





                           
















        




















                              
   
 




Using the above results for the optimal consumption and the value function 
leads to the results presented in the main text. 
 
 Transversality Condition for the Public Sector 
In any infinite horizon dynamic optimization problem, the present value of the 
state variables is required to converge to zero as the planning horizon recedes towards 










        
   
  












Hence, a positive interest rate is sufficient to fulfill the Transversality Condition 
for working in the public sector. 
 
Working in the Private Sector 
The agents' Bellman equation in the private sector becomes slightly more busy, 




                   
     
 
           
                











                











            










                                 






















                              








constitute the respective derivatives with respect to   . Bringing these results 




      





                                     
              
 
  
    
 
   

















        
            
 
 
    
 





















                                    
   
 
 








These results allow me to solve for the optimal consumption and the value 
function presented in the main text. 
 
Transversality Condition for the Private Sector 
Similarly to the public sector, but slightly busier, the following condition needs 








   
 
 
        
   
  
         
   








Using results for J, and    
   plus an algebraic simplification gives the same 












Again, a positive interest rate is enough to satisfy the Transversality Condition 
in the private sector. 
 
